The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
30.
In December
2000, the British Embassy in Washington reported growing
pressure
to change
course from containment to military action to oust Saddam
Hussein,
but
no decision to change policy or to begin military planning had
been taken by
31.
The Key
Judgements of a JIC Assessment in February 2001
included:
•
There was
“broad international consensus to maintain the arms embargo at
least
as long as
Saddam remains in power. Saddam faces no economic
pressure
to accept …
[resolution] 1284 because he is successfully undermining
the
economic
sanctions regime.”
•
“Through
abuse of the UN Oil-for-Food [OFF] programme and smuggling of
oil
and other
goods” it was estimated that Saddam would “be
able to appropriate
in the region
of $1.5bn to $1.8bn in cash and goods in 2001”, and
there was
“scope for
earning even more”.
•
“Iranian
interdiction
efforts” had “significantly
reduced smuggling down
the Gulf”, but
Saddam had “compensated by exploiting
land routes to
Turkey and
Syria”.
•
“Most
countries” believed that economic sanctions were
“ineffective,
counterproductive
and should now be lifted. Without active enforcement,
the
economic
sanctions regime” would “continue to erode”.16
32.
The Assessment
also stated:
•
Saddam
needed funds “to maintain his military and security apparatus
and
secure its
loyalty”.
•
Despite the
availability of funds, Iraq had been slow to comply with
UN
recommendations
on food allocation. Saddam needed “the Iraqi
people to
suffer to
underpin his campaign against sanctions”.
•
Encouraged
by the success of Iraq’s border trade agreement with
Turkey,
“front‑line
states” were
“not
enforcing sanctions”.
•
There had
been a “significant increase in the erosion of sanctions over the
past
six months”.
33.
There were
differences of view within the UK Government about the
benefits
of in‑country
inspections, based on a concern that they could hand the initiative
to
Saddam
Hussein without offering any substantive gains.17
34.
The stated
position of the UK Government in February 2001 was that
containment
had been
broadly successful.18
15
Letter
Barrow to Sawers, 15 December 2000, ‘Iraq’.
16
JIC
Assessment, 14 February 2001, ‘Iraq: Economic Sanctions
Eroding’.
17
Minute
McKane to Sawers, 15 February 2001 attaching Note,
‘Iraq’.
18
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 26
February 2001, column 620.
318