4.1 | Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

109. Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) noted the US indictment of Usama Bin

Laden and deplored the fact that the Taliban continued to provide him with a safe haven

“to operate a network of terrorist training camps … and to use Afghanistan as a base

from which to sponsor international terrorist operations”.57

110. The resolution:

• insisted that the Taliban authorities should “comply promptly” with previous

resolutions “and in particular cease the provision of sanctuary and training for

international terrorists and their organisations …”;

• demanded that the Taliban turn over Usama Bin Laden to a country where he

could be “effectively brought to justice”; and

• decided to impose sanctions on the Taliban.

111. In January 2000, the JIC stated that :

“UBL retains his interest in obtaining chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear

(CBRN) materials and expertise. In autumn 1999 there was intelligence that he had

recruited … chemicals specialists … Our assessment remains that UBL has some

toxic chemical or biological materials, and an understanding of their utility … But we

have yet to see hard intelligence that he possesses genuine nuclear material.”58

112. By August 2000, the JIC concluded that, although other Islamist extremist groups

had an interest in non-conventional weapons, Usama Bin Laden posed the most severe

threat.59

113. Addressing the terrorist threat from unconventional weapons in January 2001,

the JIC stated:

“The actual threat does not match the media hype. Almost all the available

intelligence refers to terrorist interest in CB materials, rather than to specific attack

plans. There is no credible intelligence that any terrorist except UBL has the

capability or serious intent to explore the use of weapons-grade materials – nor,

except for Chechen extremists, radiological material. Terrorists interested in CB are

generally those least constrained by public opinion … [T]he risks of attacks using

toxic materials have always been greater overseas.

“UBL has sought CBRN materials for use as terrorist weapons … From his public

statements and interviews it is clear that he believes it is legitimate to use them

as weapons …

57 UN Security Council resolution 1267 (1999).

58 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 122.

59 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,

paragraph 123.

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