The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
185.
Mr Gray
pointed out that:
•
Resolution
1441 required Iraq to declare all relevant material even if it was
not
used for
WMD production.
•
UNMOVIC had
an extensive database of dual‑use facilities and it was
thought
that there
could be a need to examine about 700 sites.
•
UNMOVIC
could take some time to scrutinise and update that “mass of
material
(even US
analysts with very large resources at their disposal) have admitted
…
that going
through the material could take months)”.
•
There was
an expectation that there would be “many discrepancies”
between
the Iraqi
declaration and UNSCOM documentation and approvals
under
resolution
661 (1990).
186.
Sir David
Manning warned Mr Blair in late November that there would
be
pressure on
President Bush to move to military action as soon as Iraq
submitted
the
declaration required by resolution 1441.
187.
The UK
position remained that the declaration could not constitute
a
casus
belli. If an “audit” by the inspectors subsequently discovered
significant
discrepancies
in the declaration that could constitute a material
breach.
188.
Following a
conversation with Dr Rice on 24 November to “explore next
steps on
Iraq”,
Sir David Manning reported to Mr Blair that Dr Rice
had returned to the suggestion
she had
made in their discussion during the NATO Summit in Prague that
Dr Blix
should
audit Iraq’s declaration and the information provided by the US and
UK; and that
she was:
“…
confident this would expose an ‘audit gap’. It was very unlikely
Saddam would
account for
the WMD outstanding … and very unlikely that Saddam would
include
the details
of secret holdings …”61
189.
Sir David
stated that he had told Dr Rice that he thought
Mr Blair:
“… would
have no difficulty with this. Establishing a base‑line audit was
presumably
what the
declaration was all about … we could not accept that the
declaration
itself could
be a casus belli. But we were in no doubt that if the declaration
proved
false when
Blix and UNMOVIC began their inspections Saddam would be
in
material breach.”
190.
Sir David
added that, if it was decided to adopt that strategy, “we should
try to bring
the French
and Russians with us. This pointed to a discussion in the Security
Council …”
61
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 24 November 2002, ‘Iraqi: Conversation
with Condi Rice’.
36