15.1 | Civilian
personnel
666.
Officials
explained that the search for Arabic speakers across the three
services
had
exhausted the pool of suitably qualified regular soldiers, and the
mobilisation
of reserves
had exhausted the pool of linguists in the Territorial Army (TA).
Training
individuals
to the level required for the 39 core posts took 10‑12
months.
667.
MOD officials
explained that allocating 18 of the 39 posts to civilians offered
a
partial
solution, but there was still a need to fill the remaining 21 posts
every six months
for the
foreseeable future. Proposals included:
•
an increase
in the provision of training by the Defence School of
Languages;
•
expansion
of the pool of TA linguists;
•
further
civilianisation;
•
a request
for FCO assistance, judged unlikely to succeed because of the
FCO
commitment
to the CPA; and
•
redeployment
of Arabic‑speaking Defence and Military Attachés at
British
Embassies,
thought likely to damage relations with FCO staff in
those
Embassies
and affect working relationships with host countries.
668.
It is not
clear from the papers seen by the Inquiry which, if any, of
those
recommendations
was implemented during Op TELIC.
669.
In early 2004,
the press reported that several language students at UK
universities
were
putting their degrees on hold to work in Iraq as interpreters and
translators for
the UK
military.437
By
mid‑February, 16 students had been employed, with five
already
working in
Iraq.
670.
MOD guidance
on the military contribution to peace support operations
published
in June
2004 made only passing references to language skills. It
stated:
“The
ability to negotiate and mediate will place a premium on basic
language skills.
However,
working through interpreters is currently more usual and therefore
should
be
practised before deployment.” 438
671.
The absence of
clear UK military doctrine on language capability was addressed
in
2013.439
A Joint
Doctrine Note on linguistic support to operations stated that the
military:
•
had only “a
modest standing language capability … not well placed to
support
operational
planning or high readiness deployment needs”; and
•
had been
“inherently slow to build capability for enduring
operations”.
437
The
Guardian, 18
February 2004, Language
students to help army in Iraq.
438
Ministry of
Defence, Joint
Warfare Publication 3‑50: The Military Contribution to Peace
Support
Operations, June
2004.
439
Ministry of
Defence, Joint
Doctrine Note 1/13: Linguistic Support to
Operations, March
2013.
359