3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
435.
The letter
stated that since 1991, Iraq had been “implicated” in “only one
terrorist
plan
directed against a Western target – a planned car bomb attack on
ex-President
Bush in
Kuwait in 1993”. The letter reflected the JIC Assessment, of 21
November 2001
(see
Section 3.1), that Saddam Hussein was likely to order terrorist
attacks only if he
perceived
that his regime was threatened. It stated:
“If Saddam
were to initiate a terrorist campaign … Iraqi capability to mount
attacks in
the UK is
currently limited. We are aware of no Iraqi intelligence (DGI)
officers based
in the UK.
There are up to […] DGI agents here who report on anti-regime
activities.
But most of
these agents lack the inclination or capability to mount terrorist
attacks.
So if the
DGI wished to mount attacks in the UK it would need to import teams
from
overseas.”
436.
Addressing a
potential chemical or biological attack, the letter stated that
there had
been “media
stories” during the Gulf Conflict and:
“… a 1998
scare (arising from a tale put about by Iraqi émigrés) that
Saddam
planned to
send anthrax abroad in scent bottles. Given Iraq’s documented
CB
capabilities,
we can anticipate similar stories again.”
437.
“Most Iraqi CB
attacks” had, however, been “assassination attempts
against
individuals”
and there was “no intelligence that Iraq has hitherto planned or
sought
mass-casualty
CB terrorist attacks”. If the survival of the regime was in doubt,
Saddam
Hussein’s
“preferred option would be to use conventional military delivery
systems
against
targets in the region, rather than terrorism”.
438.
The letter
also described the steps being taken by the Security Service in
response
to the
potential threat.
439.
Sir David
Omand, Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator from September
2002
to April
2005, told the Inquiry that, in March 2002, the Security Service
judged that the
“threat
from terrorism from Saddam’s own intelligence apparatus in the
event of an
intervention
in Iraq … was judged to be limited and
containable”.156
440.
Baroness
Manningham-Buller confirmed that position, stating that the
Security
Service
felt there was “a pretty good intelligence picture of a threat from
Iraq within the
UK and to
British interests”.157
441.
Baroness
Manningham-Buller added that subsequent events showed that
the
judgement
that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to do anything much
in the
UK, had
“turned out to be the right judgement”.158
156
Public
hearing, 20 January 2010, page 37.
157
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 6.
158
Public
hearing, 20 July 2010, page 9.
465