3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
324.
Other points
which Mr Blair and Mr Howard discussed
included:
•
Dr Blix
was writing his report on the presumption that there would be more
time
and it was
implicit in his approach that there would be more
time.
•
Concern
that the report would be critical of Secretary Powell’s
presentation
to the
UN on 5 February.
•
Russia and
China were likely to abstain in a vote on a second resolution
and
France and
Germany might put forward a rival text.
325.
Mr Blair
told Mr Howard that:
“… people
in the UK were suspicious that the US were eager to use force and
did
not want
the inspections to work. They could accept the need for war, but
not for war
now. If
Blix came up with a firm report that could change. The report on
the 28th [of
February]
should be the final report. The US needed in parallel to ensure the
support
of the
Security Council.”
326.
In response to
Mr Howard’s assessment that a second resolution was not
needed
for legal
reasons, Mr Powell said that UK lawyers were studying the
issue. Mr Blair said
it was
needed for political reasons.
327.
In the
subsequent press conference, Mr Blair stated that the
discussion had been
“dominated”
by Iraq.90
He and
Prime Minister Howard had agreed that Iraq needed to
disarm and
resolution 1441 had to be upheld.
328.
Prime Minister
Howard praised Mr Blair’s “strong and principled stance” and
his
“strong and
effective leadership” and stated that he believed:
“… very
strongly that if the whole world speaking through the United
Nations
Security
Council said with one clear voice to Iraq that it had to disarm
then that
would more
than anything else be likely to bring forth the faint hope of a
peaceful
solution.”
329.
In reply to a
question, Mr Howard stated that the problem was not time, it
was
Iraq’s
attitude.
330.
Mr Blair
was asked whether Iraq’s ballistic missiles were enough to justify
military
action; and
whether the news overnight of a North Korean threat that its
missiles could
hit US
targets anywhere in the world “presented a more urgent and larger
threat to
international
stability”. He replied that the judgement on Iraq had to be “made
in the
round” in
the context of resolution 1441. In relation to the need to confront
the threat
from North
Korea, albeit “by different means”, Mr Blair emphasised that
the United
Nations
would be “tremendously weakened and undermined” if it showed
“weakness
and
uncertainty over Iraq”. That was “the key issue”.
90 Australian
Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 13
February 2003, Joint
Press
Conference
with Prime Minister, Tony Blair.
237