The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
630.
The first Red
Team report (‘Regional Responses to Conflict in Iraq and
the
Aftermath’)
was issued on 28 February.276
It
described Iraq as “a very complex society”
and
cautioned that “any attempt to analyse it in neat categories based
on religion,
ethnicity
or tribe will almost certainly be over simplistic”. The report
advised that, by
comparison
with the previous British mandate in Iraq, which had relied on
advisers
like
Gertrude Bell with an intimate knowledge of the country and its
people, “our
understanding
of Iraqi society today can be shallow”.
631.
The Red Team’s
key judgements drew heavily on earlier JIC Assessments
and
included:
•
the need
for Coalition Forces to assume immediate responsibility for law
and
order to
avoid other forces stepping into an internal security
vacuum;
•
that most
Iraqis would initially view the Coalition as a liberating force,
but support
was likely
to erode rapidly if the interim administration was not acceptable
to the
population
and it could not see a road map towards a pluralist,
representative
Iraqi‑led
administration;
•
the risk of
creating fertile ground for Al Qaida, which could deliberately
cause
civilian
casualties to undermine the establishment of a representative
Iraqi-led
administration.
632.
The report
stated that Al Qaida:
“… seeks
removal of Western presence/influence from the Gulf and wants to
see the
US/UK
operation go badly. AQ [Al Qaida] are currently in some disarray
but will wish
to take the
opportunity presented by the US/UK operation to re-establish
credibility
and
encourage widespread anti-Western activity in the region.
However:
•
Initially
AQ shares a common goal with the Coalition: regime change.
Once
completed,
goals will diverge rapidly and UK/US forces will present a
rich
target for
terrorist attack.
•
AQ fears
the establishment of a pluralist, representative Iraqi
government
as it
undermines their argument that Muslims can only achieve
self-
determination
in a unitary Islamic theocracy. They could deliberately
cause
civilian
casualties to undermine the Coalition’s position.”
633.
Dr Brewer
set out Ms Short’s views on the scale of DFID’s
post-conflict
contribution
in a letter to departments on 24 February.
276
Minute
PS/CDI to APS2/SofS [MOD], 28 February 2003, ‘Iraq Red Team –
Regional responses to
conflict in
Iraq and the Aftermath’ attaching Paper, DIS Red Team, ‘Regional
Responses to Conflict in Iraq
and the
Aftermath’.
422