The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
713.
In his weekly
update on 3 April, Maj Gen Shaw reported that despite “the
noise
of everyday
events” the “surprising thing is how much UK campaign aspirations
are on
track”.388
He
attributed that to an increasing US and Iraqi desire to accelerate
transition
to
PIC.
714.
Maj Gen Shaw’s
report also reflected on UK understanding of the
political
dynamics
within Iraq:
“When this
HQ arrived we came with a thesis based on the work of the
historian
Charles
Tripp … that Iraqi power had been split since the 1920s between the
official
and the
shadow states; that the official state had been degraded by the
Iran‑Iraq
war,
sanctions and then the 2003 invasion and subsequent CPA decisions;
and that
the 2005
elections were more of a census than a democratic election – people
voted
on
sectarian lines. The result is an official state (political
structures and parties)
populated
by the shadow state (militias), much of it backed by their own dark
state
(death
squads, secret cells). The removal of Saddam removed the major
unifying
factor in
Iraq; now there is competition within and between these layers of
power.
After three
months … this analytic prism [is] the only one that makes sense of
what
is going on
here.”
715.
Maj Gen Shaw
observed that:
“It is
people’s actions, rather than their affiliations to a particular
militia, that
determine
whether they are a force for stability in Iraq or not. Muthanna and
Dhi Qar
achieved
PIC precisely because of the stability generated by Badr/SCIRI
dominated
political
and ISF institutions; Maysan’s PIC is based on JAM/OMS ability to
deliver
stability
and in particular the Governor of Maysan who is a Sadrist and
who
undoubtedly
has links to JAM in the Province. He is also, however, one of the
most
convincing,
technocratic and professional politicians I have met in Iraq; if
anyone
can deliver
Maysan, he can.”
716.
Looking ahead,
Maj Gen Shaw wrote:
“The major
question for the South is the scale and depth of Iran’s ambitions
with
regard to
Iraq. While Iran seeks currently to use its backing of a number of
groupings
to create a
level of instability for MNF, the question is what its ambitions
are once
MNF has
departed. There will always be an Iranian influence in Iraq, the
bonds of
family and
tribe reach back years and do not respect the artificial borders
drawn
by others.
Economic trade across the border is an essential feature of life
and is
potentially
a positive factor for both Iraq and Iran in the future. Our
assessment at
present
therefore is that an unstable neighbour is not in the longer‑term
interests
388
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 3 April 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 03
April 2007’.
134