10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
579.
Mr Powell
forwarded the record to Mr Blair, who commented: “But what do
we
580.
On 8 November,
the AHGI confirmed that departments were now
“encouraged,
where
necessary, to engage those outside Government in prudent
contingency planning
as long as
such contact is discreet. This extends to DTI planning on the UK
role in a
post-Saddam
economy, particularly in the oil sector.”336
581.
Sir Christopher
Meyer wrote to Sir David Manning on 15 November, reporting
the
Embassy’s
recent discussions with UK oil industry
representatives:
“We have
made clear that the US motivation as regards Iraq parallels our
own:
this is a
matter of national security, not oil. We emphasised the flat
denials we
have
received from State Department that any such discussions [between
non-UK
companies
and the US Administration] are under way.
“Nevertheless,
the rumours persist. It is not clear … what went on behind the
scenes
at the
US/Russia energy ‘summit’ in Houston last month … We have seen
a report
from our
team at CENTCOM [US Central Command] which suggests that
the
Pentagon
has already awarded a contract to Kellogg, Brown and Root, a
subsidiary
of
Halliburton, to restore the Iraqi oil industry to production levels
of 3m bpd … We
have so far
been unable to obtain collateral for this from the Administration,
and it
might well
in any case amount to no more than prudent contingency planning
to
stabilise
Iraqi oil facilities if Saddam attempts to damage them in a
conflict.
“Either
way, there is clearly an issue here which we need to tackle … My
view
remains
that the only realistic way in to this is via a PM [Mr Blair]
intervention with
Bush … The
points to make would be:
•
Once Saddam
has been disarmed … Iraq’s oil industry will be central to
…
economic
recovery.
•
We, as you,
have energy majors who have skills and resources to help
…
•
To give the
lie to suggestions that this campaign is all about oil, it is
vitally
important
that, once sanctions are lifted, there is seen to be a level
playing field
for all
companies to work in Iraq.”337
582.
Sir Christopher
stated that “by being too squeamish and slow off the mark, the
UK
did badly
out of the Kuwait reconstruction contracts in 1991”. The approach
outlined
above was
the least the UK should do, to avoid a similar
outcome.
583.
The Kellogg,
Brown and Root (KBR) contract referred to by Sir Christopher
was
likely to
be the US$1.9m contract to plan the repair of Iraq’s oil
infrastructure awarded
335
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute FCO [junior official] to Arthur, 13
November 2002,
‘BP/Iraqi
Energy’.
336
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 11 November 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
337
Letter
Meyer to Manning, 15 November 2002, ‘Iraqi Oil’.
461