The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
317.
The UK
Government assessed that Iraq had failed to comply with a
series
of UN
resolutions. Instead of disarming as these resolutions had
demanded,
Iraq was
assessed to have concealed materials from past inspections
and
to have
taken the opportunity of the absence of inspections to revive
its
WMD programmes.
318.
In Section 4,
the Inquiry has identified the importance of the ingrained belief
of the
Government
and the intelligence community that Saddam Hussein’s regime
retained
chemical
and biological warfare capabilities, was determined to preserve and
if possible
enhance its
capabilities, including at some point in the future a nuclear
capability, and
was
pursuing an active and successful policy of deception and
concealment.
319.
This construct
remained influential despite the lack of significant finds by
inspectors
in the
period leading up to military action in March 2003, and even after
the Occupation
of
Iraq.
320.
Challenging
Saddam Hussein’s “claim” that he had no weapons of
mass
destruction,
Mr Blair said in his speech on 18 March:
•
“… we are
asked to believe that after seven years of obstruction
and
non‑compliance
… he [Saddam Hussein] voluntarily decided to do what
he had consistently
refused to do under coercion.”
•
“We are
asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years – contrary
to
all
history, contrary to all intelligence – Saddam decided unilaterally
to destroy
those
weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd.”
•
“… Iraq
continues to deny that it has any weapons of mass destruction,
although
no serious
intelligence service anywhere in the world believes
it.”
•
“What is
perfectly clear is that Saddam is playing the same old games
in
the same
old way. Yes, there are minor concessions, but there has been
no
fundamental
change of heart or mind.”154
321.
At no stage
was the proposition that Iraq might no longer have chemical,
biological
or nuclear
weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or
the
policy
community.
322.
Intelligence
and assessments were used to prepare material to be used to
support
Government
statements in a way which conveyed certainty without acknowledging
the
limitations
of the intelligence.
323.
Mr Blair’s
statement to the House of Commons on 18 March was the
culmination
of a series
of public statements and interviews setting out the urgent need for
the
international
community to act to bring about Iraq’s disarmament in accordance
with
154
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
18 March 2003, columns 760-764.
612