1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
268.
Mr Annan
added that his predecessor as Secretary-General had offered him
only
one piece
of advice when he left office at the end of 1996:
“Watch out
for the question of Iraq … It will become very
important.”
269.
In a speech at
Georgetown University on 26 March 1997, Dr Madeleine
Albright,
the new US
Secretary of State, reaffirmed that US policy in Iraq was “part of
a broad
commitment
to protect the security and territory of our friends and allies in
the Gulf”.122
270.
Quoting
President George HW Bush, Dr Albright stated that, as well as
driving Iraq
out of
Kuwait, the US objective in launching Operation Desert Storm in
1991 had been
to cause
Iraq once again to “live as a peaceful and co-operative member of
the family
of
nations”. Iraq’s leaders had, however, “continued to defy the will
of the international
community”
and “from the outset”, chosen “denial, delay and deceit”. They
had:
“… lied …
blocked inspections, concealed documents, falsified evidence
and
challenged
UNSCOM’s clear and legitimate authority.”
271.
Dr Albright
added that, following the defection of Lt Gen Kamil, it had
“appeared for
a time, as
if it would cause Iraq finally to accept the need for full
disclosure”, but that had
not been
the case and Iraq’s “refusal to co-operate fully continued”. The US
would be
“unwavering”;
it would “not allow Iraq to regain by stonewalling the Security
Council what
it
forfeited by aggression on the battlefield”. An international
consensus “that Iraq should
not be
allowed again to threaten international peace” had been
sustained.
272.
Dr Albright
stated that Iraq’s military threat to its neighbours was
“greatly
diminished”,
and, “As long as the apparatus of sanctions, enforcement,
inspections and
monitoring”
was “in place”, Iraq would “remain trapped within a strategic box”.
But she
warned that
it was “essential” that international resolve did not
weaken:
“Containment
has worked, but … the future threat has not been erased.
Iraq’s
behaviour
and intentions must change before our policies can
change.”
•
“yet to
provide convincing evidence that it has destroyed all” its chemical
and
biological
weapons;
•
“admitted
loading many … [chemical and biological] agents into
missile
warheads”
before the Gulf Conflict;
•
retained
“more than 7,500 nuclear scientists and technicians, as well
as
technical
documents related to the production of nuclear weapons”;
and
•
“been
caught trying to smuggle in missile guidance
instruments”.
122
Speech,
26 March 1997, ‘SecState Albright Policy Speech on Iraq, March
26’.
71