10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
might
redirect some Trust Fund money into co-financing DFID’s IISP, or
through the
provincial
governments which DFID was supporting.
237.
In a meeting
with IMF officials, Mr Dinham offered DFID support to help
establish
an IMF
presence in Iraq. He reported that the IMF was “more responsive” to
the offer
than the
World Bank.
238.
In Washington,
US State Department officials briefed Mr Dinham on US
plans
to
re-programme some reconstruction funds to fund security in areas
where no
reconstruction
could take place, and to increase funding for projects that would
have
more
immediate impact on the ground. That meant cutting some larger
infrastructure
projects,
including in the South. The US objective was to encourage other
donors, in
particular
Japan, Arab states and possibly the European Commission (EC), to
take on
longer-term
infrastructure projects.
239.
In meetings
with UN officials, Mr Dinham welcomed progress in implementing
UN
Trust Fund
projects (although he felt that it could be faster) and the news
that two UN
senior
development officials were now permanently based in
Baghdad.
240.
The DFID
review of infrastructure requirements in the South referred to
by
Mr Dinham
at the 11 February meeting of the ISG was submitted to the 24
February
meeting of
the AHMGIR.140
241.
The paper
stated that a DFID team had recently assessed how DFID could
help
improve
infrastructure in southern Iraq. As a result, Mr Benn had
“approved work to bring
forward
quickly” DFID’s £40m IISP.
242.
The majority
of IISP funds would be used to undertake repairs and
improvements
to existing
infrastructure. To ensure a visible impact on the ground, the
programme
would fund
larger projects (with a value of more than £500,000). Priority
would be given
to projects
which would have an impact within six to 12 months and generate
significant
employment.
75 percent of the budget was earmarked for power, the rest to
improve
water
supplies and the fuel distribution network.
243.
The paper
stated that an “alternative approach” would be to invest
available
resources
in new power generation. That would take several years to come on
line and
would be “a
drop in the ocean” of Iraq’s power needs. Substantially greater and
quicker
impact
could be achieved by well-targeted repairs and rehabilitation, and
building
Iraqi capacity.
244.
The paper also
stated that: “Taken with existing commitments, this new
programme
[the IISP]
means that there will be little scope for additional DFID
initiatives in Iraq that
involve
expenditure in 2005/06.”
140
Paper DFID,
21 February 2005, ‘Reconstruction – outcome of DFID mission on
infrastructure in the
South; and
involvement of other major players’.
235