12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1274.
Mrs Beckett
decided in October that the majority of civilian staff should
be
withdrawn
from Basra Palace and relocated to Basra Air
Station.1185
1275.
In an IPU
paper considering the impact of that drawdown it was assessed
that:
•
ACC Barton
and a small number of police advisers already based at Basra
Air
Station
would be unaffected.
•
The key
current task for the remaining police advisers in Basra was work
to
support
Op SINBAD for which they needed to be based in Basra Palace
or
another
MND(SE) site in the city. The TIPS programme, run out of the
PJCC
(co‑located
with the Basra Police Headquarters) would also be
affected.
•
Prisons
work would be affected as Iraqi Corrections Service staff preferred
to
visit Basra
Palace than from Basra Air Station, and unannounced prison
visits
were also
more easily made from Basra Palace than Basra Air
Station.
•
There would
be a negative impact on the Rule of Law work being carried out
by
the
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT).1186
1276.
The IPU
recommended that the police team at Basra Palace should be
reduced
by 14
officers, three of whom would relocate to the Air Station. The
remainder would
leave Iraq.
That would “retain just enough officers in the city to provide
essential support
to
Op SINBAD”. The prisons team would leave theatre “pending
progress on the Basra
Central
Prison project” and “we would need to think hard about whether the
PRT could
have enough
real impact to justify the costs and risks of maintaining it at its
current size.”
1277.
Brigadier
James Everard, Commander 20 Brigade, reporting in place
of
Maj Gen Shirreff,
expressed concern that that move would have a negative effect
on
SSR work,
making it impossible to train the specialist police teams that
would take over
from the
corrupt SCU and hampering the planned move of Iraqi prisoners out
of the
Jameat
facility into a new facility.1187
1278.
Brig Everard
also reported the murder of 17 Iraqi interpreters and
locally
employed
contractors employed at the Basra Police Academy. He
advised:
“How the
ISF (particularly the police) deal with this incident should be an
important
test.
Unsurprisingly, they may disappoint. There is a lack of IPS will to
prosecute a
JAM‑linked
case with much vigour, let alone conduct any arrests.”
1279.
A paper
drafted on 30 December by the Deputy Chief Police Adviser
proposed
that there
would be 31 International Police Advisors, nine police officers
(not including
1185
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 30 October 2006,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
27 October’.
1186
Minute
Casey to Sawers, 24 October 2006, ‘Iraq: DOP: Political Strategy
and Basra Palace Site’.
1187
Minute
Everard, 2 November 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 2
November 2006’.
351