4.4  |  The search for WMD

49.  On 10 April, Sir David Manning chaired a meeting to discuss the search for WMD.26

Participants included Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service

(SIS)), Mr Scarlett, Mr William Ehrman (FCO Director General Defence and Intelligence),

Air Marshal Sir Joe French (Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI)) and Air Vice Marshal

Clive Loader (Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations)).

50.  Sir David identified three areas where co-ordination was necessary:

• the search for material on the ground;

• tracking down and interviewing Iraqi personnel involved in WMD programmes; and

• public presentation of the issue and media handling of finds.

51.  Sir David commented that “US handling of those issues did not seem particularly

structured. We could no doubt do better than the UNMOVIC inspections.”

52.  Sir Richard Dearlove underlined that co-ordination with the US, which might want to

control the search for WMD, was the key. He reported that SIS experts were already in

Iraq. SIS was re-examining old material in the hope that it would generate leads.

53.  Mr Scarlett identified four problems:

• the large number of Iraqis involved in WMD programmes and their concealment;

• the volume of documentation, much of which had been dispersed;

• the munitions, which UNMOVIC assessed had been concealed and dispersed in

a disorganised manner; and

• co-ordination in the UK and with the US.

54.  Sir David commissioned further advice from Mr Martin Howard, Deputy Chief of

Defence Intelligence (DCDI), including whether there were any points Mr Blair would

need to raise directly with President Bush.

55.  Sir David concluded that the group would meet again to discuss the Whitehall

machinery that should be established “to track and drive forward work in this area”.

56.  Mr Howard sent advice on next steps to Mr Hoon the following day.27 This addressed

both the response to Sir David Manning and US proposals for a new organisation, the

ISG, to take forward activity in the post-conflict phase.

57.  Mr Howard recommended that Mr Hoon:

• approve a letter to Sir David Manning emphasising the need for Coalition

commanders to give priority to WMD detection and elimination, and informing

No.10 of the MOD’s intention to offer elements of the UK WMD expertise already

in Iraq to the ISG and to consider what more could made available; and

26  Minute Cannon to PS/C, 11 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Searching for Evidence of WMD’.

27  Minute Howard to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 April 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Detection and Elimination’.

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