9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
8.
In relation to
AQ-I, the JIC assessed that it was failing to maintain its
strategic impact
and no
longer represented the most immediate threat to Iraq’s security,
although it was
“unlikely
to be eradicated” and could re-generate without sustained military
pressure.
9.
The JIC
assessed that the international threat from Iraqi Shia militias
was
“negligible”.
10.
In terms of
tackling the threat, the JIC judged:
“ISF as a
whole are in a much better position than a year ago. But their
ability to
defeat AQ-I
and JAM Special Groups will depend heavily on their Special
Forces,
which will
rely on MNF support for aviation, airborne surveillance and
operational
planning
for some years.”
11.
Recent
operations in Basra led the JIC to conclude that “significant
problems”
remained in
the ISF’s ability to tackle determined opposition
alone:
“We assess
their ability to successfully manage security outside Baghdad by
the end
of 2008,
without MNF ground support will continue to be patchy and depend
heavily
on progress
being made on national reconciliation and the maintenance of
MNF-led
security
gains.”
12.
Mr Brown,
Mr David Miliband (the Foreign Secretary), Mr Douglas
Alexander
(the International
Development Secretary) and Mr Des Browne (the Defence
Secretary),
plus Air
Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup (the Chief of the Defence Staff),
Mr Christopher
Prentice
(British Ambassador to Iraq), Mr Simon McDonald
(Mr Brown’s Foreign Policy
Adviser)
and Mr Matt Cavanagh (Mr Brown’s Special Adviser) met
General David
Petraeus
(Commanding General Multi-National Force – Iraq) and Ambassador
Ryan
Crocker (US
Ambassador to Iraq) on 1 May.2
13.
Mr Brown’s
Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs reported that Gen Petraeus
had
emphasised
the political dynamic in Iraq as increasingly more important than
the military.
Mr Miliband
explained that the challenge for the UK was to make the transition
from
a military
strategy in the South to a political strategy for the whole of
Iraq. In his view,
provincial
elections were the next key step.
14.
The discussion
moved to the Charge of the Knights (see Section 9.6), during
which
“swift
US/UK action” had ensured the right outcomes, leaving JAM and other
local militia
on the back
foot. Gen Petraeus considered that the next priority was support
for Prime
Minister
Maliki’s plan for Sadr City. ACM Stirrup described key planned UK
actions in
Basra and
Gen Petraeus agreed that a clear division of labour
existed.
15.
Mr Alexander
reported that the recent investment event in Basra (see Section
10.2)
had been a
success. Ambassador Crocker commented that there needed to be
greater
synergy
between the Iraqi reconstruction fund and the Basra Development
Commission.
2
Letter
Fletcher to Rimmer, 2 May 2008, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with General Petraeus, 1 May’.
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