12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
judge, only
partially effective: undermined by personal and party rivalries,
endemic
corruption
and the absence of a capable bureaucracy. This is unlikely to
change
significantly
in the foreseeable future. […]
“Both the
MOI and MOD still face significant difficulties in effectively
administering
their
rapidly expanding forces … Corruption and sectarianism still
permeate the
1101.
Reports to
Congress between November 2006 and March 2007 highlighted
the
work being
undertaken to tackle corruption in the MOI:
•
Internal
Affairs: By the end of September 2006, 650 out of a total of
around
1,000 MOI
Internal Affairs officers had received specialised training.
Training
for all
personnel was expected to be completed by March
2007.1022
•
“Quicklook”:
A coalition‑initiated, MOI‑led police reform programme
called
“Quicklook”
was launched in December 2006.1023
It aimed to
review all aspects
of the
performance and effectiveness of Iraqi police stations, beginning
in
Baghdad. It
comprised visits by representatives from Police Affairs,
Internal
Affairs,
Human Resources, Training and Administrative Directorates and
was
complemented
by the PTTs.
•
Dismissals:
By August 2006, over 230,000 MOI employees had been
screened
by the
Iraqi Police Screening Service, against Ba’ath Party records
and
Saddam
Hussein‑era criminal records.1024
Possible
positive hits numbered
5,300,
leading to the dismissal of 74 personnel. By March 2007, there had
been
1,228 dismissals
with a further 2,143 dismissals pending.1025
The
screening
process was
severely hampered by its inability to check for militia links;
to
counter
that, IPS recruits were required to take an oath of office
denouncing
militia
influence and pledging allegiance to Iraq’s
Constitution.1026
The DoD
reported to Congress on 26 May 2006 that the Iraqi National Police
had
been
created on 1 April 2006.1027
The
Minister of Interior signed an order to reorganise
and merge
the Police Commandos, the Public Order and Mechanised Police and
the
Emergency
Response Unit to form a single force under a single
headquarters.
An eGram
from Mr Asquith on 7 December explained that the intention
behind the
National
Police was to create a mixed ethno‑sectarian force, filling the gap
between
the
“provincial” IPS and the Iraqi Army in dealing with serious civil
disorder and internal
1021
JIC
Assessment, 17 January 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Prospects in
2007’.
1022
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1023
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1024
Report to
Congress, 29 August 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1025
Report to
Congress, 2 March 2007, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1026
Report to
Congress, 30 November 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
1027
Report to
Congress, 26 May 2006, Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq.
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