9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
499.
Mr Bearpark
told the Inquiry that he viewed this attack as a turning
point:
“We were
very, very clearly on an upward slope until then … We believed that
the
CPA was
getting better at what it was meant to do and we were all
optimistic …
From [that
point] onwards, then the graph just went sharply
down.”279
500.
On 30 October,
Secretary Powell told Mr Straw that it had been agreed
in
Washington
that the Seven Step Plan should be maintained, but
accelerated.280
At the same
time, work would be undertaken to look for
alternatives.
501.
At the end of
October, Mr Sawers wrote to Mr Straw with a paper on the
political
process in
Iraq which described “ways of modifying the seven-point
plan”.281
502.
The paper was
based on the twin assumptions that Occupation must end in
2004
and that a
permanent Constitution and elections were not possible in that
timescale.
503.
Mr Sawers
proposed changing the UK’s objective to the creation of a
provisional
government
in 2004. It would be supported by a provisional assembly, which
would be
indirectly
elected “perhaps using electoral colleges based on the
Governorates”.
504.
Since an end
of Occupation would mean the end of the CPA the paper
included
a proposal
for a new international structure “on the Bosnian model with a
high
representative
appointed by the Coalition and having some reserved powers
endorsed
by the
Security Council”.
505.
In an annex to
the paper Mr Sawers suggested that this new approach
might
encourage
more nations to participate in the military security effort in
Iraq, since troops
would no
longer be part of an Occupation and might be present in response to
a request
from an
Iraqi Government.
506.
US thinking
appeared to be moving in a similar direction.282
By the end of
October,
the British
Embassy Washington reported that there was growing recognition in
the US
Administration
that Ambassador Bremer’s Seven Step Plan would not lead to
credible
elections
on the basis of a legitimate Constitution sufficiently
quickly.
507.
During
internal discussions in Washington, however, Ambassador Bremer
was
reported to
have stuck to his Seven Point Plan.283
279
Public
hearing, 6 July 2010, pages 43-44.
280
Letter
Adams to Sheinwald, 30 October 2003, ‘The Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with the US
Secretary
of State, 30 October’.
281
Minute
Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 31 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
282
Minute
Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 31 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’; Letter Manning to
Sheinwald,
28 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’; Telegram 1481
Washington to FCO London,
8 November
2003, ‘Iraq: MOD Policy Director’s Visit to Washington: 7
November’; Letter FCO [junior
official]
to Sawers, 31 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’.
283
Telegram
1426 Washington to FCO London, 28 October 2003, ‘Iraq: US Views, 28
October’.
289