12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
On 29
September 2004, Mr Stuart Jack, FCO Director Iraq, provided an
update on
a revised
Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) Strategy to Mr Straw’s
Private
Secretary.561
The
Strategy had three objectives:
•
building the
capacity of the Iraqi Government and civil society to carry
out
conflict
prevention and resolution;
•
preventing
further polarisation and reducing underlying tensions
between
different
elements of Iraqi society; and
•
building the
capacity of the security sector, with special emphasis on the
police
and
prisons.
On funding,
Mr Jack wrote that Mr Blair had asked the GCPP to fund up
to £2m for
a project
supporting the MOI. That was in addition to a £2.5m MOD bid
approved by
AHMGI on
16 September to purchase equipment for the ISF.562
Both
projects were
considered
to serve “our broader Iraq objectives”, although the ISF project
only “just
about” met
published eligibility criteria for the supply of military
equipment.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Hoon and Mr Benn on 4 October with the
revised Strategy,
recommending
that the FCO, the MOD and DFID endorse it.563
Mr Straw
flagged that
funding was
“over‑committed” that financial year and warned that future project
proposals
for Iraq
would need to be carefully considered in that light.
There is no
record that Mr Benn or Mr Hoon formally endorsed the
Strategy.
623.
Mr Robert
Davies, Chief Police Adviser to the MOI, produced a briefing on the
IPS
for
Mr Straw on 6 October.564
He
wrote:
“The
impatient focus on increasing its size (aspiration force of 130K –
there are 130K
on current
payroll but only 90K accounted for!) has led to a large number of
police
joining the
service as a result of General Petraeus’ drive for ‘30K in
30 days’, who
have not
received any training and who are of questionable integrity and
quality.”
624.
Mr Davies
summarised the IPS as “… brave but subject to intimidation, in
part
poorly led,
weak in structures according to western standards, and in need of
further
equipment”.
625.
Mr Davies
also noted that there was no forensic examination of serious
crime,
intelligence
gathering was weak and “the inability of the IPS to plan operations
is
causing all
sorts of serious problems in combined operations”.
561
Minute Jack
to Private Secretary [FCO], 29 September 2004, ‘Global Conflict
Prevention Pool –
Iraq
Strategy’.
562
Minutes, 16
September 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
563
Letter
Straw to Benn, 4 October 2004, ‘Global Conflict Prevention Pool –
Iraq Strategy’.
564
Minute Owen
to Crompton, 12 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Police Service’ attaching
Email Davies to Owen and
Hurley, 6
October 2004, ‘The Iraqi Police Service’ and Paper, [undated], ‘The
Iraq Police Service [IPS]’.
191