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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
Global Conflict Prevention Pool strategy update
On 29 September 2004, Mr Stuart Jack, FCO Director Iraq, provided an update on
a revised Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) Strategy to Mr Straw’s Private
Secretary.561 The Strategy had three objectives:
building the capacity of the Iraqi Government and civil society to carry out
conflict prevention and resolution;
preventing further polarisation and reducing underlying tensions between
different elements of Iraqi society; and
building the capacity of the security sector, with special emphasis on the police
and prisons.
On funding, Mr Jack wrote that Mr Blair had asked the GCPP to fund up to £2m for
a project supporting the MOI. That was in addition to a £2.5m MOD bid approved by
AHMGI on 16 September to purchase equipment for the ISF.562 Both projects were
considered to serve “our broader Iraq objectives”, although the ISF project only “just
about” met published eligibility criteria for the supply of military equipment.
Mr Straw wrote to Mr Hoon and Mr Benn on 4 October with the revised Strategy,
recommending that the FCO, the MOD and DFID endorse it.563 Mr Straw flagged that
funding was “over‑committed” that financial year and warned that future project proposals
for Iraq would need to be carefully considered in that light.
There is no record that Mr Benn or Mr Hoon formally endorsed the Strategy.
Suggestions for improvements in SSR
623.  Mr Robert Davies, Chief Police Adviser to the MOI, produced a briefing on the IPS
for Mr Straw on 6 October.564 He wrote:
“The impatient focus on increasing its size (aspiration force of 130K – there are 130K
on current payroll but only 90K accounted for!) has led to a large number of police
joining the service as a result of General Petraeus’ drive for ‘30K in 30 days’, who
have not received any training and who are of questionable integrity and quality.”
624.  Mr Davies summarised the IPS as “… brave but subject to intimidation, in part
poorly led, weak in structures according to western standards, and in need of further
equipment”.
625.  Mr Davies also noted that there was no forensic examination of serious crime,
intelligence gathering was weak and “the inability of the IPS to plan operations is
causing all sorts of serious problems in combined operations”.
561  Minute Jack to Private Secretary [FCO], 29 September 2004, ‘Global Conflict Prevention Pool –
Iraq Strategy’.
562  Minutes, 16 September 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq meeting.
563  Letter Straw to Benn, 4 October 2004, ‘Global Conflict Prevention Pool – Iraq Strategy’.
564  Minute Owen to Crompton, 12 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Police Service’ attaching Email Davies to Owen and
Hurley, 6 October 2004, ‘The Iraqi Police Service’ and Paper, [undated], ‘The Iraq Police Service [IPS]’.
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