The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
change per
se” was “not a proper basis for international action”, it could
“result from
action
which is otherwise lawful”.109
252.
The UK would
regard the use of force as lawful if it was:
•
exercised
in the right of individual or collective self-defence;
or
•
carried out
to avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe; or
•
authorised
by the Security Council.
253.
The legal
position on the use of force in Iraq would “depend on the
precise
circumstances
at the time”. A legal base for an invasion of Iraq was “in
principle
conceivable”
in relation both to self-defence or a humanitarian catastrophe, but
it
would be
“difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of
immediacy and
proportionality”.
Further legal advice would be needed on that point.
254.
That left “the
route under the UNSC resolutions on weapons
inspections”.
There had
been “no substantive progress” in the three rounds of talks held by
the
UN
Secretary-General with Iraq to persuade them to admit the
inspectors. The Iraqis
were
“deliberately obfuscating”. The Cabinet Office paper stated that Mr
Annan had
“downgraded
the dialogue” but more “pointless talks” were
possible.
255.
The UN and the
international community needed to be persuaded that
the
situation
could not be “allowed to continue ad infinitum”; and “to set a
deadline, leading
to an
ultimatum”. It would be “preferable” to obtain the “backing” of a
Security Council
resolution
for the ultimatum. Early work would be necessary to explore the
scope for
achieving
that.
256.
The paper
stated that “in practice”, Saddam Hussein was “likely to admit
weapons
inspectors
as a means of forestalling” military action, but “once admitted he
would not
allow them
to operate freely”.
257.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that, under the provisions of resolution
1284
(1999) it
would take UNMOVIC:
“… at least
six months after entering Iraq to establish the monitoring and
verification
system …
necessary to assess whether Iraq is meeting its obligations. Hence,
even
if UN
inspectors gained access today, by January 2003 they would at best
only just
be
completing setting up. It is possible that they will encounter
Iraqi obstruction
during this
period, but this [is] more likely when they are fully
operational.”
258.
An earlier
draft of the paper had been more explicit about the timetable
for
inspections
set out in resolution 1284 and more cautious about the
consequences,
109
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
46