4.4 | The
search for WMD
272.
During his
subsequent statement about the G8 summit in Evian, France,
from
1 to
3 June, Mr Blair was asked repeatedly about the search
for WMD and to consider
an
independent inquiry.146
273.
In response to
Mr Duncan Smith, Mr Blair stated:
“… the Iraq
Survey Group is the body that will be able to … interview the
scientists
and visit
the sites. There are literally thousands of sites … information is
coming up
the entire
time, but it is only now … that a dedicated team of people, which
includes
former UN
inspectors … will be able to go in and do the job properly … I
have
no doubt
that they will find the clearest evidence of Saddam’s weapons of
mass
destruction.
“The
alternative thesis is that, having for years obstructed the UN,
having had 12
years of
sanctions, having kicked out the inspectors in 1998, and having
invited
an invasion
by defying the UN, Saddam decided to get rid of the weapons of
mass
destruction
anyway. That is an odd thesis to accept.”
274.
Referring to
the press reporting of remarks made by Secretary Rumsfeld
and
Mr Wolfowitz,
Mr Blair added that the full transcripts of the interviews
showed they were
“arguing
that it will be difficult to say exactly what has happened to the
weapons until we
collect the
evidence”; and that it had always been the UK Government’s case
that there
had been “a
systematic campaign of concealment once Saddam knew the
inspectors
were going
back in”.
275.
In response to
points raised by Mr Ken Clarke (Conservative), including on
the
wider
consequences if it turned out that the Government’s assertion that
military force
was needed
to disarm Iraq turned out not to be true, Mr Blair
replied:
“… the
basis on which we went to conflict was that in resolution 1441,
Iraq was given
a final
chance to comply … and the conclusion that we drew six months later
was
that it was
not doing so. The problem in the UN Security Council is that we
could
not get
agreement even to the fact that, if it [Iraq] carried on not
complying fully
and
unconditionally … we could take action. That was obviously an
unacceptable
situation.
“… I stand
entirely by the dossier that we issued and the intelligence
contained in
it … When
we get a proper and fully documented account of what it [the ISG]
has
found, we
will present it … [It] would be sensible to suspend our judgement
until that
time, but I
stand fully by what our intelligence agencies put out
…”
276.
Asked by Ms
Barbara Follett (Labour) about the role of the UN, Mr Blair
stated that
“for
obvious reasons there will have to be some independent
verification” at the end of
the
process; and that was being discussed by Mr Straw with his
counterparts.
146
House of
Commons, Official
Report,
4 June 2003, columns 157-176.
477