9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
492.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald sent the UK’s post-election work plan to Mr Hadley
on
21 December.233
Sir Nigel
observed that “early action will be needed with Shia
and
Kurdish
politicians to promote the broad-based and inclusive government the
Prime
Minister
and President want”.
493.
On 21
December, ACM Torpy warned Lt Gen Fry that “we need to press
ahead
rapidly, to
keep the initiative” on PRTs.234
494.
ACM Torpy
wrote that MOD funding might be needed if “as first
indications
suggest,
neither FCO nor DFID can find any further financial resources”. He
observed
that “we
will also need to push the other Departments to deploy the staff
necessary to
get the
PRTs off the ground quickly”.
495.
Mr Straw
spoke by telephone to President Talabani on 21
December.
He emphasised:
“… the
process of de-Ba’athification should not be allowed to derail the
formation of
a new
Government. It was important that Sunni Arabs did not feel
excluded, with the
risk that
the insurgency would continue and escalate to civil
war.”235
496.
Mr Blair
visited Basra on 22 December to meet British troops and civilians
based
there.236
He also had
a discussion about the political process following the election
and
about
security issues with senior UK and US diplomats and military
officers including
Gen Walker
and Gen Casey.
497.
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary reported that:
“The Prime
Minister said we needed to keep the political and military
strategies in
synch. What
were the prospects for eg further detainee releases and
negotiated
local
cease-fires? Casey said
the US were working on further, large-scale
releases.
But these had to be part of a wider reconciliation process and
secure
some
movement from the other side. We would also have to look carefully
at the
reintegration
process, as detainees were often radicalised by their
experience
of detention.”
498.
Mr Blair
told the group of diplomats and military officers that the US and
UK
would need
to work quickly with the new government “on a forward
perspective”,
covering
security and Iraqiisation and MNF drawdown as well as the
government’s
broad
programme which “could serve as a rallying point for international
support to
the new government”.
233
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 21 December 2005, ‘Iraq’.
234
Minute CJO
to DCDS(C), 21 December 2005, ‘Key Operational Issues for Early
2006’.
235
Email
Wilson to Asquith, 22 December 2005, ‘Foreign Secretary’s Call to
Talabani: 21 Dec’.
236
Letter
Quarrey to Hayes, 22 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Visit
to Basra’.
571