The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
had been
attacked a number of times, resulting in a “very minor” MNF
casualty and
“some
vehicle damage”. Seven attackers had been killed.
1290.
The PJHQ
official stated that 127 prisoners were found and that the Iraqi
Army
had
transferred them to the Warren facility. “Some 80 percent” of the
prisoners “showed
signs of
torture”. A search of the Jameat site uncovered weapons, grenades,
shells and
bomb‑making
equipment. The MNF demolished part of the building to prevent it
from
being
reoccupied.
1291.
There had been
a mixed reaction from the Iraqi Government to the operation.
A
spokesperson
from the IMOD had reiterated that the Iraqi Army was involved;
making
clear that
the MNF did not act alone. Governor Waili and tribal leaders had
offered “very
strong
support” but some of those briefed on the operation beforehand had
since said
they were
unaware of the MNF’s intent. That was believed to be due to militia
pressure.
1292.
Reflecting on
the Iraqi reaction to Op THYME, Lt Gen Shirreff told the
Inquiry:
“Maliki was
generally supportive, Governor Waili was delighted, the tribal
sheikhs
within
Basra were delighted, the principal cleric of the largest Shia
mosque in Basra,
with a
congregation of 10,000 people on Friday prayers, thanked me for
delivering
the people
of Basra from this nest of vipers.”1195
1293.
On 28
December, Mr Dominic Meiklejohn, Deputy Consul General in
Basra,
described
the ISF’s role in Op THYME as “significant”.1196
The
performance of Brigadier
Ibrahim,
the only member of the Basra Security Committee in the country, had
been
“less
encouraging”, getting “cold feet at the last moment” and ordering a
Commander
of 10th
Division not to participate. Consequently, the brigade failed to
provide the outer
cordon as
planned.
1294.
Mr Meiklejohn
reported that Prime Minister Maliki had claimed not to know
about
the
operation, despite it being raised with him on three separate
occasions. Some
members of
the Provincial Council had criticised the operation publicly but
those were
the “usual
suspects”. At a local, tactical level reactions had been positive,
and although
local media
had suggested the IPS would no longer be participating in
Op SINBAD, the
PTTs had
been “welcomed warmly” at police stations. He wrote:
“… excising
the SCU has demonstrated that MNF and ISF have the will and
capacity
to root out
militia influence over the IPS. The SCU were not the only offenders
but
had become
a signal of what was wrong with the IPS. The operation … sent
a
powerful
signal to Basra.
“There is
still much to do. MNF operations against the Shia militias remain
outside
[Prime
Minister] Maliki’s comfort zone. Local ISF commanders are scared of
being
1195
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 31.
1196
eGram
57155/06 Basra to FCO, 28 December 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra: Action
Against Serious Crime Unit’.
354