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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
paper.23 The first suggested agenda item was security. “Key issues” for discussion
included:
how to dismantle Iraq’s secret security agencies, and to handle the defeated
armed forces?
how to provide legitimate and transparent law and order, and the necessary civil
structures to deliver them?
the co‑operation of the Iraqi police …
longer‑term Security Sector Reform and DDR planning.”
30.  Reporting to Mr Straw after the talks, Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle
East and North Africa, said that the exchanges had gone “better than expected”, but
also explained that “as we suspected, apart from on humanitarian relief and immediate
post‑conflict reconstruction, the US have not yet made much progress on a lot of the
day‑after agenda”.24
31.  No discussion of SSR was recorded in reports of the Washington talks to Ms Clare
Short, International Development Secretary, or Mr Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary.25
Neither was it referred to in the reporting telegram from the Embassy.
32.  An FCO official who attended the talks reported to Mr Dominick Chilcott in the
Middle East Department that the “key message” was that Mr Donald Rumsfeld,
US Secretary of Defense, had ordered his staff to plan both the military and civil
administration of Iraq, and that this work was “going ahead fast, whether we like it
or not”.26 Plans were expected to be signed off in about a week’s time. Once that
had happened, the official judged that it would be “very difficult to reverse what
had been decided”.
33.  Following the talks, Mr Drummond proposed that six working groups should be
established to “pursue issues which require further planning”.27 None of those groups
were tasked to consider planning for SSR.
23  Letter Brenton to Abrams, 16 January 2003, ‘US/UK/Australia Trilateral Talks on Iraq: 22 January 2003’.
24  Minute Chaplin to Secretary of State [FCO], 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: ‘Day‑After’ Issues’.
25  Minute Chaplin to Secretary of State [FCO], 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: ‘Day‑After’ Issues’; Telegram 89
Washington to FCO London, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: US/UK/Australia Consultations on Day After Issues:
22 January 2003’; Minute Lee to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 23 January 2003, ‘Aftermath: Visit to
Washington’; Minute Miller to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 23 January 2003, ‘UK/US/Australia talks,
Washington: 22 January 2003’.
26  Minute Middle East Directorate [junior official] to Chilcott, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: PJHQ Meeting on
‘Aftermath’.
27  Letter Drummond to Chaplin, 23 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Working Groups’.
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