3.7  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

743.  Sir David Manning commented that he was not sure Mr Blair would have much

enthusiasm for Sir John’s first recommendation, but it was worth “bearing the argument

in mind”.222 Sir David agreed with Sir John’s second point.

744.  Mr Blair replied: “We sh[oul]d wait ‘til the right moment.”223

745.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock remained concerned about the lack of support in the

Security Council and the implications, including the legal implications, of putting

the resolution to a vote and failing to get it adopted.

746.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that in the circumstances Sir John Holmes had

identified (fewer than nine positive votes but everyone else abstaining), the resolution

would not be adopted and it would have no legal effect.224 He found it:

“… hard to see how we could draw much legal comfort from such an outcome; but

an authoritative determination would be a matter for the Law Officers. (Kosovo was

different: in that case a Russian draft condemning the NATO action as illegal was

heavily defeated, leaving open the claim that the action was lawful … (or at least

was so regarded by the majority of the Council).)

“Furthermore, in the current climate … the political mandate to be drawn from a

draft which failed to achieve nine positive votes seems to me likely to be (at best)

weak … The stark reality would remain that the US and UK had tried and failed

to persuade the Council to endorse the use of force against Iraq. And the French

(and the Russians and Chinese) would no doubt be sitting comfortably among

the abstainers …

“My feeling … is that our interests are better served by not putting a draft to a vote

unless we were sure that it had sufficient votes to be adopted … But we should

revisit this issue later – a lot still had still to be played out in the Council.”

747.  Following discussions with the US and Spanish Missions in New York on

25 February, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that the “key arguments” in relation

to Canadian and other benchmarking proposals were:

“• it was impossible accurately to define key remaining disarmament tasks,

or other benchmarks, in the absence of Iraqi co-operation …

• the Council had to accept there would never be total clarity …

• 1441 set the benchmarks for Iraqi co-operation, benchmarks it had manifestly

failed; and

• the big picture was that we were being taken for a ride …”225

222  Manuscript comment Manning to Prime Minister, 25 February 2003, on Letter Holmes to Manning,

24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: France’.

223  Manuscript comment Blair on Letter Holmes to Manning, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: France’.

224  Letter Greenstock to Manning, 25 February 2003, [untitled].

225  Telegram 309 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 26 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 25 February’.

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