The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

117. Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei met Mr Blair and Mr Straw on 6 February, before a visit

to Baghdad on 8 to 9 February.29

118. The FCO briefing note stated that:

“Since the Prime Minister last saw Blix on 17 January, he has hardly put a foot

wrong. His statement to the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 27 January was

stronger than many expected: in particular he helpfully made clear that Iraq was

not offering the full and active co-operation that the UNSC expected, and there

were serious unanswered questions, and that Iraq still did not accept that it had

to disarm.”30

119. In the meeting with Mr Blair, Dr Blix registered a number of questions about

Secretary Powell’s briefing to the Security Council the previous day.31 He also said

that intelligence leads had so far produced only one success.

120. The record of the meeting stated that Dr Blix:

“… would seek to resolve three relatively minor points related to process:

U2 overflights, interviews, and Iraqi domestic legislation. His approach would be

that the Iraqis had better come up with co-operation on substance … If Saddam

decided to be as helpful on substance as he was on process, fine.”

121. Mr Blair doubted that Saddam Hussein would co-operate:

“He would try some trick to divide the Security Council. Retaining his WMD was

essential to his own view of his grip on Iraq.”

122. Dr Blix reminded Mr Blair that: “UNSCOM had not reported that the 1999

left-overs were present in Iraq, just that they were unaccounted for.” UNMOVIC was

more cautious than the UK, but Dr Blix agreed that if Iraq did not have documents it

should be more eager to allow interviews to go ahead. There was a stalemate on the

issue. The inspectors might have to ask for interviews without minders, but Dr Blix was

uneasy about risking people’s lives.

123. Dr Blix was reported to have informed Mr Blair that his report to the Security

Council on 14 February would probably contain a “balance sheet”. His last assessment

had been “honest but harsh”; the next might have to say that the inspectors “had not

found any WMD”.

29 Letter Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meetings with Blix and El-Baradei,

6 February’.

30 Minute Owen to Rycroft, 5 February 2003, ‘The Prime Minister’s Meeting with Hans Blix, UNMOVIC,

and Mohamed El-Baradei, IAEA’.

31 Letter Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meetings with Blix and ElBaradei,

6 February’.

200