3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
credible
and reasonable not only by the Council members, but by the
public
at large.”
•
What
happened in Iraq would “not take place in a vacuum”; it had
“implications
– for
better or worse – for other issues of great importance to the US
and
to the world.
For instance, it will greatly affect the climate in which we
conduct
our
struggle against international terrorism.”
•
The UN and
the US were successful when there was “strong US
leadership,
exercised
through patient diplomatic persuasion and coalition-building”. The
UN
was “most
useful to all its Members, including the US” when it was “united,
and
works as a
source of collective action rather than discord”.
Dr Blix’s
account of the discussions in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February recorded
that they
had been
“professional and had shed some new light, but had not really
brought any new
evidence”.43
He and
Dr ElBaradei had been given new assurances that people
would
be
“encourage[d]” to provide interviews without minders or recording
equipment and the
mandate for
the special commission appointed to search for any remaining
chemical
weapons was
extended to cover any prohibited items, but the questions about U-2
flights
remained
unresolved until shortly after the visit.
Dr Blix
concluded that they “had obtained much less than we felt was
needed” but their
“overall
impression” had been that the Iraqis were genuinely rattled”. The
Iraqis continued
to do “too
little, too late”.
Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei reported the discussion to the Security Council on 14
February.
173.
The
Security Service warned on 6 February that Al Qaida would use an
attack
on Iraq to
step up activity in the UK.
174.
Mr Blair
had a meeting with Mr Hoon, Mr Straw, Admiral Sir Michael
Boyce (Chief
of the
Defence Staff (CDS)), Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret
Intelligence
Service
(SIS)), Ms Eliza Manningham-Buller (Director General of the
Security Service),
Mr Scarlett,
Air Commodore Mike Heath (Head of the MOD Directorate of
Targeting
and
Information Operations), and No.10 officials on 6 February, during
which he was
briefed on
the targeting aspects of an air campaign, for his meetings with
Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei,
and on the terrorist threats to UK interests.44
“C [Sir
Richard Dearlove] reported that Blix was making clear there could
be no
aggressive
inspections in mosques and cemeteries. He also said that no
serious
interviews
had taken place at all because there had been so much
intimidation.
43
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2005.
44
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting, 6 February’.
211