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3.7  |  Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003
credible and reasonable not only by the Council members, but by the public
at large.”
What happened in Iraq would “not take place in a vacuum”; it had “implications
– for better or worse – for other issues of great importance to the US and
to the world. For instance, it will greatly affect the climate in which we conduct
our struggle against international terrorism.”
The UN and the US were successful when there was “strong US leadership,
exercised through patient diplomatic persuasion and coalition-building”. The UN
was “most useful to all its Members, including the US” when it was “united, and
works as a source of collective action rather than discord”.
Discussions in Baghdad, 8 to 9 February 2003
Dr Blix’s account of the discussions in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February recorded that they
had been “professional and had shed some new light, but had not really brought any new
evidence”.43 He and Dr ElBaradei had been given new assurances that people would
be “encourage[d]” to provide interviews without minders or recording equipment and the
mandate for the special commission appointed to search for any remaining chemical
weapons was extended to cover any prohibited items, but the questions about U-2 flights
remained unresolved until shortly after the visit.
Dr Blix concluded that they “had obtained much less than we felt was needed” but their
“overall impression” had been that the Iraqis were genuinely rattled”. The Iraqis continued
to do “too little, too late”.
Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei reported the discussion to the Security Council on 14 February.
The impact of military action on the terrorist threat to the UK
173.  The Security Service warned on 6 February that Al Qaida would use an attack
on Iraq to step up activity in the UK.
174.  Mr Blair had a meeting with Mr Hoon, Mr Straw, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce (Chief
of the Defence Staff (CDS)), Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS)), Ms Eliza Manningham-Buller (Director General of the Security Service),
Mr Scarlett, Air Commodore Mike Heath (Head of the MOD Directorate of Targeting
and Information Operations), and No.10 officials on 6 February, during which he was
briefed on the targeting aspects of an air campaign, for his meetings with Dr Blix and
Dr ElBaradei, and on the terrorist threats to UK interests.44
175.  Mr Campbell wrote:
“C [Sir Richard Dearlove] reported that Blix was making clear there could be no
aggressive inspections in mosques and cemeteries. He also said that no serious
interviews had taken place at all because there had been so much intimidation.
43  Blix H. The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2005.
44  Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting, 6 February’.
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