3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
Crawford
meeting, but he had remained in contact with the Legal Secretary to
the Law
Officers
over the following months.87
193.
Mr McKane told
the Inquiry that the main consideration in deciding when to
engage
Lord
Goldsmith was the difficulty in seeking formal advice when there
wasn’t a specific
proposition
to put before him.88
194.
Asked about
Lord Goldsmith’s request to be involved in Ministerial thinking
about
Iraq policy
as it developed rather than at the last minute, Lord Wilson told
the Inquiry that
there had
been no need to involve the Attorney General as no decisions needed
to be
taken. He
offered the view that Lord Goldsmith might have written to the
Cabinet Office
because
previous incidents had taught him the importance and difficulty of
the issues
involved in
military action, and the importance of being involved
early.89
195.
Mr Blair
told the Liaison Committee on 16 July that he believed
weapons
of mass
destruction posed an enormous threat to the world.
196.
There was
no doubt that Iraq posed a threat in respect of weapons
of
mass
destruction which should be dealt with. No decisions had been taken
on
military action.
197.
Mr Blair
was not seeking to influence the US but to work in
partnership.
198.
The question
of military action in Iraq was raised during Oral Questions to
the
Defence
Secretary on 15 July. Mr Hoon assured Mrs Alice Mahon (Labour)
that:
“Absolutely
no decisions have been taken by the British Government in relation
to
operations
in Iraq or anywhere near Iraq … I can assure the House that any
such
decision
would be properly reported to the House.”90
199.
In response to
a subsequent question from Mr Bernard Jenkin
(Conservative)
about links
between Al Qaida and the Iraqi regime, Mr Hoon replied that there
was no
evidence of
any direct links and any new information would be
investigated.91
He
added:
“Let us not
be in any doubt about Iraq. We cannot ignore the threat it poses to
the
international
community. We have always made it clear that the world would
be
a much
better and safer place without Saddam Hussein.”
87
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 44.
88
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 47.
89
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 60-61.
90
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 15 July
2002, column 10.
91
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 15 July
2002, column 11.
37