The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
work with
NOC management to ensure continued physical operation
of
non‑damaged
facilities and continued exports …;
•
work with
NOC management to ensure administrative integrity, including
staff
retention
and payment of salaries;
…
•
initial
quick assessment of oil sector spending needs …”
142.
The specific
operational objectives for oil in the first 60 days were
to:
•
prepare an
emergency budget for the oil sector;
•
arrange for
“urgent work” on oil infrastructure; and
•
assess
recent oil exports outside the OFF programme.
143.
The same
version of the paper was sent to Mr Blair on 7
March.
144.
A Treasury
official invited Mr Brown’s comments on officials’ “first
thoughts”
on Treasury
policies in a post-Saddam Iraq on 11 February (see Section
13.1).76
The
Treasury assessed that the cost of ensuring Iraq’s prosperity and
stability was
difficult
to predict but “potentially massive”. Iraq was potentially a rich
country and the
“obvious
answer” was that Iraq should pay “the lion’s share” of its
reconstruction from
its oil
revenues. However, there were several reasons why that might not
cover all –
or even
the majority – of the cost of reconstruction:
•
Iraq’s oil
infrastructure could be damaged in any conflict, or
sabotaged.
•
The price
of oil could fall.
•
There would
be pressure for Coalition countries to pay for
reconstruction.
•
The OFF
programme provided up to US$10bn a year for Iraq. That was
enough
to keep
Iraq “ticking over”, but it was not clear whether it was enough to
pay for
reconstruction.
•
A
post-conflict Iraq might have to pay war reparations and service
the country’s
huge
debt.
145.
The official
proposed that an “emerging policy position” would include
maximising
the Iraqi
contribution to the cost of reconstruction, initially by
maintaining the OFF
programme.
146.
The Treasury
told the Inquiry that Mr Brown did not
comment.77
147.
Mr John
Grainger, an FCO Legal Counsellor, sent the Iraq Planning Unit
(IPU)
an outline
of the legal position on occupying forces’ rights to deal with oil
reserves
76
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 11 February 2003, ‘HMT
Policy on Post-Saddam Iraq’
attaching
Paper Treasury, 11 February 2003, ‘Post-War Iraq: International
Financing Policy’.
77
Email
Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 26
February 2010, [untitled].
396