3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
582.
In a
meeting on 17 January, Mr Blair urged Dr Blix to tell
Baghdad that this
was their
last chance and the US was serious about military action. If Iraq
was
co‑operating,
the inspectors would need more time; if it was not, it would be
better
to make
that clear soon.
583.
Reporting on
the discussion in the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 15 January,
Mr Paul
Johnston,
Head of the FCO Security Policy (Sec Pol) Department, informed
Mr Straw
that it was
UK information which had led to the discovery of SA‑2 (Volga)
engines,
but “It was
not yet clear whether they constituted a material
breach.”196
The MOD
was
considering
providing additional interviewers to support UNMOVIC, “whose
resources
were
stretched. Evidence from Iraqi scientists might be the most likely
basis for an
eventual
material breach.”
584.
Mr Johnston
also reported that the FCO was addressing “how far and how
fast
the US
might push to bring matters to a head in the Security Council if,
after 27 January,
the
Americans became concerned that ‘business as usual’ had set in”.
Mr Blair’s visit
to the
US at the end of January might be too late to influence the
immediate US reaction
to the
Council discussion. Mr Blair might try to call President Bush
the following week.
585.
In preparation
for Mr Blair’s meeting with Dr Blix on 17 January, the
FCO advised
No.10
that:
•
Dr Blix
had made a “sound start in getting UNMOVIC operational”; the UK
had
provided
“considerable support, which we believe is beginning to show
fruit”.
•
UK
intelligence had helped UNMOVIC to discover illegally imported
rocket engines.
•
The key
message was the need for UNMOVIC to intensify its inspections,
not
to focus
exclusively on infrastructure, which was “often easy to conceal or
move
around”,
and to focus on interviews, both formal and informal, of Iraqi
scientists.
•
The UK had
doubts about the practicality of interviews outside Iraq but
was
looking at
ways to try to overcome those.
•
Expectations
were “running high” for the 27 January meeting. The UK
was
making
clear that it was “not a deadline but a status report”. After that,
while
the
“strategy outlined in 1284” would give UNMOVIC “60 days to identify
key
disarmament
tasks”, the UK wanted to use the next phase to “put
maximum
pressure on
Iraq to co‑operate in answering all unresolved
questions,
eg, including
use of mobile laboratories”.
•
The UK
thought Dr Blix should offer to brief the UN Security
Council
more
regularly, perhaps once a fortnight. That would include reporting
illegal
imports for
consideration of further action “even if there is no proven link
to
196
Minute
Johnston to Private Secretary [FCO], 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs
of Staff: 15 January’.
197
Letter
Davies to Rycroft, 15 January 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Hans Blix, UNMOVIC’.
103