The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
161.
A second order
was also announced which re‑introduced the death penalty
for
around 30
crimes. Most of those crimes related to actions which resulted in
the death
of another
person, but the list also included:
“… where
there has been an armed uprising against the armed forces;
where
an armed
uprising aims to invade another country or seize public property;
and
the
distribution of narcotics with the aim of aiding those trying to
overthrow the
Government
by force. It also introduces a law that imposed the death penalty
on
kidnappers
who seek to broadcast pictures of their victims.”
162.
Mr Asquith
judged that the order “reflected Allawi’s belief that the
insurgents
needed to
have brought home to them the consequences of their
actions”.
163.
USA
Today reported that
in relation to the amnesty order:
“Allawi
said:
“This order
has been established to allow our citizens to rejoin civil society
and
participate
in the reconstruction of their country and the improvement of their
lives,
instead of
wasting their lives pointlessly towards a lost cause …
“Iraqi
officials had earlier said the amnesty might extend to those who
had killed US
and other
coalition troops.”137
164.
FCO officials
had seen a draft of the amnesty order in July at which point it
covered
“both
Iraqis and foreigners”.138
165.
On 9 August,
Mr Asquith reported to the FCO that Prime Minister Allawi had
been
“reaching
out to Ba’athists inside and outside the country”.139
Some had
been prepared
to talk but
“there was too little time before [elections in] January to put in
place a political
party that
could represent them and be accepted by the rest of
Iraq”.
166.
During a
discussion with Sir Nigel Sheinwald on 8 September, Prime
Minister
Allawi
reported “variable success” on drawing people away from the
insurgency.140
He
explained:
“The Sunni should not feel they had lost power. Some would help to
resist
radical
Islamist forces if they were brought back into the
fold.”
167.
When
Mr Blair visited Iraq 11 days later, Prime Minister Allawi
told him that he had
spoken to
“a number of ex‑Ba’athists in the region – Yemen, UAE and Jordan.
They
were ready
to talk.”141
He hoped
that a conference would be convened in Jordan to make
to make it
clear that they were ready to “move on and re‑engage”.
137
USA
Today, 7 August
2004, Iraq passes
amnesty law for minor players in insurgency.
138
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 13 July 2004, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
139
Telegram
107 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security: Prime
Minister’s Views’.
140
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 9 September 2004, ‘Nigel Sheinwald’s meeting with
Allawi, 8 September’.
141
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 19 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Prime Minister
Allawi,
Sunday 19 September’.
34