14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
was no
requirement in Afghanistan for more helicopters at the time, just a
utility to
having more
helicopters so we could meet future requirements. The military
view
was also
that there was no requirement for a new small
helicopter.”692
1320.
Asked if he
was concerned whether the MOD had an insufficient number
of
support
helicopters capable of being deployed in the threat environment of
Iraq,
Lord Drayson
wrote:
“Yes …
However it was difficult to get the military to agree on the
requirement.
Helicopters
specifically were not seen as the responsibility of any particular
service
and
therefore suffered from the lack of a ‘service champion’. It was
not believed that
helicopters
could be procured quickly …”
1321.
ACM Torpy
disagreed with Lord Drayson’s view on helicopter ownership
and
prioritisation.
He told the Inquiry that the Joint Helicopter Command did have
advocates
and
champions:
“Actually
it was owned by a single service. It was operational command
CINC
Land Forces
… So there was an advocate for Joint Helicopter Command, and
if
I look
at the interest that the three Chiefs took in Joint Helicopter
Command it was
1322.
The Inquiry
asked ACM Stirrup for his view of the helicopter situation during
his
time as
Chief of the Air Staff, from 2003 to 2006. He replied that it “was
not a significant
issue” in
Chiefs of Staff discussions during that time.694
There was a
requirement to
make
modifications as lessons were learned, but “there was no sense that
… we
needed –
urgently needed twice as many helicopters than we had, although it
was quite
clear that
we could always have used more”.
1323.
ACM Stirrup
told the Inquiry that, between 2006 and 2009, when he was Chief
of
the Defence
Staff, the constraint on the helicopter fleet was
twofold:
“First was
we had eight Chinooks sitting in a shed unable to fly. That is a
significant
percentage
of the total Chinook force …
“Secondly,
we were operating in two theatres, which was well beyond our
planning
assumptions
and although it was a strain to generate sufficient infantry
battalions for
the
rotation between the two theatres, the really critical elements
were the enablers.
They were
the strategic and tactical mobility. They were the helicopters,
they were
the ISTAR,
they were all of those specialist areas that are so important for
any
operation,
wherever it is and whatever it is.”695
692
Statement,
15 December 2010, page 8.
693
Public
hearing, 18 January 2011, page 81‑82.
694
Public
hearing, 1 February 2010, pages 17‑18.
695
Public
hearing, 1 February 2010, pages 66‑67.
223