The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
220.
Later that
afternoon, Mr Straw told Cabinet that the GC would be a
broadly
inclusive
body, incorporating “Iranian influenced Shia and communist
elements”.90
It would
“progressively” take over authority for areas of government,
subject to the
CPA’s approval.
221.
On 11 July,
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary wrote to Mr Rycroft with a
draft message
for
Mr Blair to send to the Governing Council when it met for the
first time two days
later.91
The Private
Secretary’s letter recorded that:
“The last
two weeks have seen intensive consultations with political
leaders,
religious
figures, tribal leaders and civil society representatives … Sérgio
Vieira de
Mello has
been closely involved. He has expressed firm support for our
approach …
Our
approach is in accordance with UNSCR 1483.”
222.
The letter
went on to say:
“GC will be
the Iraqi interface with the CPA and international community. It
will
nominate
interim ministers and oversee day to day running of ministries. CPA
will
consult GC
on all areas of policy. Only in exceptions would CPA act without
GC
support. GC
will formulate new national reconstruction and security policies …
and
submit
these recommendations to the CPA … Operational security matters
will
remain the
responsibility of the CPA.”
Multi-National
Division (South-East) (MND(SE)) was formally established on 12
July.92
This
coincided with a change of UK forces within the area as 1st (UK)
Armoured Division
handed over
to 3rd (UK) Mechanised Division.
The senior
UK military commander in MND(SE) – the General Officer
Commanding
(GOC MND(SE))
– reported to the US General in charge of CJTF-7, Lt Gen
Sanchez.
The first
GOC MND(SE) was Major General Graeme Lamb, who held the position
from
July to
December 2003.
Throughout
the course of Op TELIC, 11 different commanders held the post of
GOC
MND(SE),
changing roughly every six months:
•
July 2003 to
December 2003: Major General Graeme Lamb
•
December 2003
to July 2004: Major General Andrew Stewart
•
July 2004 to
December 2004: Major General William Rollo
90
Cabinet
Conclusions, 10 July 2003.
91
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 11 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Governing Council
Launch’.
92
Report
Lamb, 30 January 2004, ‘Post Operational Tour Report – Version 1
Operation Telic 2/3 11 July to
28 December
2003’.
240