3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
811.
Lord Goldsmith
told the Inquiry that was the main purpose of the conversation
with
Mr Straw
on 7 November; and he had meant that “they shouldn’t take it for
granted that,
when it
came to it and definitive legal advice was given, that it was going
to be that we
are in a
position to take military action”.277
812.
Ms Adams also
wrote:
“A vote is
expected at the end of the week. The draft … may change further …
so
you are
still not in a position to give a definitive view of what it means
(and of course
we will
need to wait and see what statements are made on
adoption).”278
813.
Mr Straw
told Parliament that the UK’s objective was consensus on a
tough
resolution
that left Iraq under no illusions about the need for
disarmament.
814.
The UK
wanted a peaceful resolution to the crisis, and the best
chance
of achieving
that was a clear and credible threat of the use of
force.
815.
If Saddam
Hussein failed to comply, it was open to any member of
the
Security
Council to table a further resolution seeking UN support for the
use of
force and
the UK reserved the right to do so. But Mr Straw could not
anticipate
what could
happen.
816.
Whether
military action was justified would depend on the
circumstances.
The UK
reserved its “right” within international law to take military
action if that
was
required.
817.
Mr Straw
made a statement to the House of Commons on 7
November.279
“… our
overriding objective is to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass
destruction
through an
effective inspections regime …
“As one of
the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, the UK
has
been
determined to ensure that the UN emerges from this crisis with its
credibility
enhanced.
During the negotiations, our aim has been to secure
consensus
on a tough
resolution that leaves Iraq under no illusions about the need
for
disarmament
…”
819.
Mr Straw
stated that the resolution used the full powers of the UN under
Chapter
VII of its
Charter and that the “key points” included the finding in OP1 that
Iraq had been
277
Public
hearing, 27 January 2010, page 32.
278
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 7 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Meeting with the
Foreign Secretary’.
279
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7
November 2002, columns 431‑451.
339