The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
of a
divisional headquarters and a single combat brigade, with four
battalions, in
a northern
option, and the possible deployment of a Royal Marines
Commando
Group to
southern Iraq, were the maximum which could be deployed given
the
requirements
of Op FRESCO and the timescale for military operations
envisaged
by the
US.
249.
The process
for approving UORs continued against a deadline of the
end
of February
for Packages 1 and 2, and the end of March for Package
3.
250.
The
difficulties surrounding desertisation measures, clothing, ECBA
and
NBC
protection continued.
251.
On
30 October, Mr Hoon’s Private Office wrote to a DCRS
official with a query
raised by
Mr Hoon while reading the UOR for Challenger 2
modifications:
“He noted
that the business case used a latest acceptable in-service date of
April
2003. He
wonders what in-service dates are currently being considered
appropriate,
given what
we know of US planning.”120
252.
The DCRS
official replied on 12 November.121
He stated that
the Challenger 2
In Service
Date (ISD) was “used with 90% confidence” and would “almost
certainly be
brought
forward”. His understanding was that modifications would “be
complete by early
March” and
did not require the vehicles to be returned to the factory; the
modifications
could be
carried out in theatre “if necessary”.
253.
The official
added that it was “not easy to align equipment ISDs with an
operation,
when the
timing of the latter is moving constantly” but “rough timeframes”
were
necessary
to negotiate delivery times and costs with industry, with the
caveat that they
were liable
to change.
254.
Adm Boyce’s
office added:
“While this
could add further flexibility to the time required for
modifications, we
should not
lose sight of the implications for tank crewmen … Our experience
in
1991 was
that such modifications … were time-consuming and
manpower-intensive.
Planning
should take account of this.”122
255.
Section 6.1
addresses Mr Blair’s decision on 31 October that the MOD
could offer
Package 3
to the US for planning purposes.
256.
Mr Hoon
was advised on 1 November by a DCRS official that 88 USURs
had
been sent
to DCRS, having been endorsed by PJHQ and DSF.123
He wrote
that 10 UOR
120
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to DCRS 1, 30 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
UORs’.
121
Minute
DCRS1 to APS/SofS [MOD], 12 November 2002, ‘Iraq:
UORs’.
122
Minute
PSO/CDS to DCRS 1, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: UORs Challenger
2’.
123
Minute DCRS
1 to APS/SofS [MOD], 1 November 2002, ‘Possible Operations
against Iraq UOR List,
1 November
2002’.
38