3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
677.
On 22 October,
Mr Straw and Secretary Powell discussed French and
Russian
concerns
that the draft text had reintroduced “automaticity” in the
preambular
paragraphs
(PPs) and in OPs 1‑3.232
678.
Mr Powell
suggested to Sir David Manning that it was “Worth bringing to the
AG’s
attention.
Shows Russians and French think OPs 1‑3 [?]
automaticity.”233
679.
Following the
conversation between Mr Straw and Secretary Powell, the
FCO
told UKMIS
New York on 22 October that it could confirm that the UK would act
as
co‑sponsor
of the resolution if that was what the US wanted.234
680.
In the face
of signs of mounting US impatience with the UN process,
Mr Blair
sought to
persuade President Bush to continue to negotiate a
resolution.
681.
Mr Blair
continued to assert that the UK would take action in the
event
of a further
material breach by Iraq.
682.
Mr Blair
did not offer any caveats to reflect the views Lord
Goldsmith
had expressed.
683.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that, after the “difficult” discussions
of the draft text
between the
P5 in New York on 22 October, Mr Blair thought the time had
come to engage
Foreign
Ministers directly in the debate.235
He had
asked Mr Straw to talk to Secretary
Powell
“about a meeting at Foreign Minister level” early the following
week. Dr Rice
thought
that was an attractive idea which she would discuss with Secretary
Powell.
684.
Mr Blair
also thought “we should revisit the possibility of agreeing the
wording of a
short
second resolution that the P5 would table if Saddam violated the
terms of the first
resolution”.
Sir David added:
“If we
could secure this, the French and the Russians would have
acknowledged, in
writing,
that they would be ready to use ‘all necessary means’ if Saddam
were again
in material
breach.”
685.
Sir David
reported that Dr Rice had doubts:
“… the
difficulty would be that the French or the Russians would quibble
over
whether
Saddam had committed a violation serious enough to trigger the
follow
up action
required for the second resolution.”
232
Telegram
560 FCO London to Washington, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 22 October’.
233
Manuscript
comment Powell to Manning on Telegram 560 FCO London to Washington,
22 October
2002,
‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation
with US Secretary of State, 22 October’.
234
Telegram
560 FCO London to Washington, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Conversation
with US
Secretary of State, 22 October’.
235
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
321