4.4 | The
search for WMD
c)
CW
… There are
no indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical
munitions
[after
1991] …
… the Iraqi
Intelligence Service maintained from 1991 to 2003 a set of
undeclared
covert
laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons,
primarily for
intelligence
operations …
The ISG
judges that Iraq had a capability to produce large quantities of
sulphur
mustard
agent within three to six months.
d)
Nuclear
Saddam
ended the nuclear programme in 1991. The ISG found no evidence
to
suggest
concerted efforts to restart the programme …
The ISG has
uncovered no information to support allegations of Iraqi pursuit
of
uranium
from abroad in the post-Operation Desert Storm era …
e) Delivery
systems
The ISG has
uncovered no evidence that Iraq retained SCUD-variant
missiles
(ie Al
Husseins) …
… The ISG
assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long
range
delivery
systems and that the systems were potentially for WMD.
The ISG has
substantial documentary evidence and source reporting indicating
that
the regime
intentionally violated various international resolutions and
agreements in
order to
pursue its delivery systems programmes.”
843.
Mr Ehrman
recommended that the Government’s public lines on the
Comprehensive
Report should focus on:
•
the
Report’s confirmation of Saddam Hussein’s breaches of resolution
1441;
•
Saddam
Hussein’s strategic intent to reconstitute his WMD when sanctions
were
lifted;
and
•
the
conclusion that sanctions and therefore containment were
becoming
progressively
less effective.
844.
Mr Ehrman
advised that many of the ISG’s points had already been covered
in
the Butler
Report, but the ISG’s “central judgement, that Iraq’s WMD
capability was
essentially
destroyed in 1991 and not reconstituted by March 2003”, was “firmer
than the
judgement
Lord Butler had reached”.
591