9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
269.
During the
conversation on Iraq, Mr Blair described the GC as a
“complete
antidote”
to the view that Iraqis were not “delighted” that Saddam Hussein
had gone.
270.
The
conversation turned to the media, and Mr Blair commented that
better Iraqi
media would
make a difference in achieving accurate reporting of events in
Iraq. They
agreed that
if there was no real improvement in a couple of weeks “top level
US/UK
media
people” would be asked to work up and implement a
plan.
Throughout
April and May, concerns were beginning to emerge within the
US
Administration
about possible Iranian activity in Iraq.137
The RAND
report on the Occupation of Iraq records that the US authorities
tracked the
activity of
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within Iraq and
occasionally
picked some
individuals up for questioning.138
There was
suspicion, within the Coalition,
that the
Iranians were actively supporting and arming the Shia Badr Corps.
On one
occasion,
UK and Danish patrols identified seven armed Iranian “border posts”
located
within
Basra and Maysan Provinces, displaying the Iranian flag within
Iraqi territory.
On 11 June
2003, the JIC issued an Assessment of Iran’s goals for Iraq, its
activity in
support of
them and the level of its influence in Iraq.139
The JIC
judged that:
“Iran wants
Iraq to be a stable, non-threatening neighbour with no long-term
foreign,
especially
US, presence. It wants influence in a future Iraqi administration.
It favours
a unified
State, but probably does not have a blueprint for how the
administration
should be
structured. It does not expect the Iranian theocratic system to be
a
model for
Iraq. But it believes that the Iraqi Shia population must have
political
representation
broadly commensurate with its numbers in a democratic
government
… Iran also
wants resumed trade, a role in reconstruction, the repatriation of
some
200,000
Iraqi refugees and Iraq’s formal recognition of the border. It
still hopes,
if
possible, for reparations for the 1980-88 Iran/Iraq war and closure
on missing
prisoners-of-war
…
“Iran would
have preferred a greater UN role in post-conflict Iraq and the
early
withdrawal
of US forces … The presence of large US forces adds to Iran’s
sense
of
encirclement … And a longer-term worry is that the resurgence of
Najaf as a
centre of
Shia teaching, and the emergence of Iraq as a successful Shia
state, could
undermine
the legitimacy of Iran’s theocratic system …
“We judge
that the Iranians instinctively see progress by the Coalition as
detrimental
to Iran,
but pragmatically realise that chaos would ensue without the
Coalition
presence …
On the basis of Iranian activity so far, we judge this remains the
broad
thrust of
Iran’s policy as implemented on the ground: to avoid direct
conflict with the
Coalition,
to develop its influence, and to take advantage of the political
process
where
possible. But it will retain the option of causing trouble for the
Coalition if it is
not
satisfied by the outcome of events.
137
Minute
Reilly to Chaplin, 1 May 2003, ‘Iran: Their Iraq Policy: Next
Steps’.
138
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
139
JIC
Assessment, 11 June 2003, ‘Iraq: Iranian Activity and
Influence’.
251