The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
953.
Asked if the
US military timetable would leave enough time to see
whether
UNMOVIC
could do its job, Mr Blair replied:
“… the
timeline was pressing … because the Americans took the view it was
absurd
to think
that Saddam was going to change his mind, because he wasn’t
…”321
954.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock suggested that the primary reason for the
second
resolution
was as a means to persuade Saddam Hussein to disarm
peacefully,
although it
would also have helped to provide a legal basis for action if
required.
955.
Asked about
the UK’s objectives for the second resolution, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
told the
Inquiry:
“I think we
had two objectives and I have thought quite carefully about
this,
because
those objectives became confused in the heat of battle and in
subsequent
interpretation
with hindsight of what happened.
“… the two
fundamental points were, first, that we had to try and create
international
pressure on
Iraq to give up WMD without a fight, and it was only possible to do
that,
as far as I
was concerned, through the United Nations, by having a very firm
body
of
international opinion that was against Iraq and determined to bring
to a halt its
12‑year
contravention of UN resolutions. That was a primary purpose behind
what
I was
trying to design as a further resolution.
“Second, we
were also concerned to establish the safest possible legal grounds
for
the use of
force if that should be necessary. We felt that we had legal
grounds in
1441, but
those grounds were contested. They were a matter of subjective
opinion.
If one
had a further resolution, establishing that there had been a
material breach
since we
had given Iraq the final opportunity, this would be unequivocal,
and that
would be
the safest possible legal grounds for the next steps, whatever they
were.”322
956.
In December
2002, President Bush said that the Iraqi declaration
of
7 December
2002 demonstrated Saddam Hussein had had “no change of
heart”.
957.
By early
January 2003, Mr Blair had concluded that the military action
was
the more
likely outcome and, if conflict could not be avoided, that the UK
should
support the
US.
958.
The Inquiry
has already concluded in Section 3.5 that Mr Blair and
Mr Straw
envisaged
that in the event of a material breach of Iraq’s obligations, a
second
resolution
determining that a breach existed and authorising the use of force
was
likely to
be tabled in the Security Council.
321
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, pages 79‑80.
322
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 64‑65.
174