The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
205.
Mr Fernie
continued:
“Mr [Mark]
Lowcock’s [DFID Director Finance and Corporate Performance]
advice
is that the
best time to extract maximum funds from the central Reserve is
when
the
political pressure is at its height. We might guess that such a
time will come in
a month or
so – by which time budgets for our existing programmes would be
more
secure,
with our 2003/04 framework finalised and on its way to
publication.”
206.
Ms Short
commented: “No – I don’t want to ring Ch X [the Chancellor of
the
Exchequer]
… I wanted to put humanitarian considerations into Gov[ernment]
mind not
just to
squeeze some money.”101
Rather than
write or speak to Mr Brown, she would
write to
Mr Blair. That letter was sent on 5 February.102
207.
On 31 January,
in response to a further request from Ms Short, a DFID
official
provided
advice on how much the UK might be expected to contribute to
“humanitarian
relief/reconstruction”
in Iraq.103
Assuming
the UK provided 5.6 percent of the total
humanitarian/reconstruction
costs (in line with the UK’s share of OECD Gross
National
Income),
the UK’s contribution could reach US$640m (£400m) a year for the
next
three years.
“It is
important to consider that DFID ‘traditionally’
(Balkans/Afghanistan) contributes
between
8-10 percent for total relief/reconstruction costs … This would
mean that
under a
high case military scenario, with low oil revenues and where
reparation/debt
claims are
not reduced, annual
costs to HMG [Her
Majesty’s Government] could
be in excess
of US$1bn.”
209.
The minutes of
the 3 February FCO Iraq Morning Meeting recorded that
DFID
was coming
under pressure to step up its humanitarian planning after the House
of
Commons
debate on 30 January.104
Dr Brewer
had explained to the meeting that there
were
serious domestic and international financial
constraints.
210.
DFID’s
financial resources are addressed in more detail in Section
13.1.
211.
FCO lawyers
advised UK participants in the post-Washington talks on
the
rights of
the Occupying Power that, under international law, aspects of
the
post-conflict
reconstruction of institutions and infrastructure could fall
outside
the
competencies of an Occupying Power.
101
Manuscript
comment Short, 22 January 2003, on Minute Fernie to PS/Secretary of
State [DFID],
21 January
2003, ‘Iraq contingency planning: financial
provision’.
102
Email DFID
[junior official] to Fernie, 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: submission of
21 January’.
103
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 31 January 2003,
‘Iraq: cost of
humanitarian
relief/reconstruction and potential UK contribution’ attaching
Paper [draft], ‘Iraq: Relief and
reconstruction:
implications for UK Government’.
104
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS [FCO], 3 February 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
346