12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
service
does the intelligence work and the arresting and locking‑up is done
by a
police
agency, that gives a useful balance, allows people to actually
focus on their
main area
of expertise and doesn’t cause the problems of the intelligence
people
having the
power to arrest and detain and do whatever else they need to do to
get
information.
Eventually … Ambassador Bremer was persuaded … and made that
as
a decision.
I could not get a special branch manager or somebody retired who
had
that skill
of being able to take the concept into reality, and so we lost the
opportunity
and that
disappeared.”239
In April
2004, the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) was
established. Its operational
officers
and support staff had been trained and vetted and were based in
Baghdad, with a
planned
outstation in Basra.240
It included
some former intelligence officers.
INIS was
initially headed by former Major General Mohammed al‑Shehwani, who
had
been forced
into exile by Saddam Hussein in 1984.241
In a paper
by the MOD dated 6 June 2006, intelligence was one of the areas
described as
“immature”,
having been “placed deliberately at the back of the force
generation process”.242
Later, in
spring 2008, a new intelligence structure was developed in
Basra.243
Lieutenent
General
Barney White‑Spunner, GOC MND(SE) from February to August 2008,
described
that
structure to the Inquiry:
“… at the
end of the Charge of the Knights, General Mohammed and I put
together,
I hope,
quite a sophisticated counter‑terrorist structure in Basra with a
co‑ordination
committee
which brought all the Iraqi Security Forces together. We fused them
into
various
intelligence agencies … We were able to combine police and army
posts
across the
city.”
280.
Two other
security forces were created under the jurisdiction of the MOI
in
autumn 2003:
•
CPA Order
No.26, signed on 24 August 2003, created the Department of
Border
Enforcement
(DBE).244
Previous
immigration officials were prevented from
employment
because of their connection to Saddam Hussein’s secret
police.245
•
CPA Order
No.27, signed on 4 September 2003, created the Facilities
Protection
Service
(FPS).246
The FPS was
designed to provide site security for ministry
239
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 45‑46.
240
Minute Dodd
to Quarrey, 30 April 2004, ‘Iraqi Security Force
Capabilities’.
241
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold, 2006.
242
Minute
DJC/Iraq to Cabinet Office [junior official], 7 June 2006, ‘Iraq:
Strategy Group Workstrands’
attaching
Paper, ‘Update on Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF)’.
243
Public
hearing, 7 January 2010, page 43.
244
Coalition
Provisional Authority Order Number 26 – Establishment of the
Department of Border
Enforcement,
24 August 2003.
245
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
246
Coalition
Provisional Authority Order Number 27 – Establishment of the
Facilities Protection Service,
4 September
2003.
119