12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
UK should
consider how to use that opportunity to influence the strategic
direction of
policing in
Iraq.
682.
Mr Chaplin
also reported that the importance of human rights had been raised
with
Gen Luck:
“These were not nice to have add‑ons but were fundamental to our
chances
of
defeating the insurgency and sustaining democracy in Iraq.”
Mr Chaplin said that
Gen Luck
“agreed entirely” but “did not say whether he intended to flag this
up”.
683.
On 23 January
2005, DCC Smith wrote a report about his role in the
“Luck
Review”.620
DCC Smith
wrote that the review’s “key recommendation” would be
PATs,
and to
embed these “to a far greater degree than current International
Police Advisors
(IPAs)”. He
noted that the concept was not “universally supported” and cited
concerns
raised by
US advisers, existing IPAs and the Minister of the Interior. DCC
Smith did
suggest
that PATs could address other police issues such as leadership
training and the
“post
initial training, quality and morale issues”. DCC Smith later
became the UK Chief
Police
Adviser in Iraq (in May 2005), a role that combined the two
previous Senior Police
Adviser
positions in Baghdad and Basra. His reports feature extensively in
this Section.
684.
During a video
conference on 17 January, Mr Blair told President Bush that
they
had to give
a sense that Iraqiisation was “going somewhere” and that things
would
change
after the elections.621
He
suggested that the Luck Review should feed quickly
into a new,
public, security plan. In Mr Blair’s view the weakness of
Iraqi structures
remained “a
real problem”.
685.
Ms Aldred
and her team in the Cabinet Office co‑ordinated a strategy paper
for the
9 February
AHMGI, which focused on how to achieve coalition objectives in
post‑election
Iraq (see
Section 9.3).622
The draft
‘Iraq: Strategy for 2005’, sent to Mr Quarrey on
8 February,
summarised General Luck’s key recommendations:
•
improve ISF
capacity to conduct independent counter‑insurgency operations
as
well as to
maintain domestic order;
•
establish
partnerships between Iraqi and coalition units and develop
military,
special
police, border force, and PATs from the coalition and embed them
within
Iraqi
forces;
•
build the
institutional capabilities of the Government (MOD and MOI) to plan
and
direct
counter‑insurgency operations; and
•
develop the
concept of bureaucratic assistance teams to help Iraqi
ministries
establish a
Government that functions across all the ‘lines of operation’
needed
for the
campaign.
620
Report
Smith, 23 January 2005, ‘Iraq Security Assessment Team’ attaching
Paper Smith, [undated],
‘Iraq
Security Assessment’.
621
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 17 January 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 17 January:
Iraq and
MEPP’.
622
Paper
Cabinet Office, 7 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Strategy for
2005’.
205