10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
information
and advice from UK businesses and there was an opportunity to
develop
the DTI’s
contacts with the Iraqi oil industry.
344.
There were a
number of issues to which the DTI needed to respond,
including
a
“worrying” proposal for eight Iraqi citizens and eight “foreigners”
to sit on the Iraq
National
Oil Company (INOC) Executive Board.
345.
Ms MacNaughton
proposed five “guiding principles” for the DTI’s
engagement
in the
oil sector. It should:
•
provide
objective information and “informed opinion” in response to
Iraqi
requests,
but not recommend policies;
•
where
necessary, work directly and build relationships with the
Iraqi
management
of INOC and the Ministry of Oil;
•
continue to
seek to increase its sight of US policy and process, including
by
continuing
to try to deploy an oil policy expert to the CPA; although
Mr Fletcher’s
deployment
had been “rebuffed repeatedly”, it should remain a priority for
the
UK;
•
ask the
British Embassy Washington to redouble its efforts to engage with
the
US;
and
•
“in
extremis”, instruct Sir Jeremy Greenstock (the Prime
Minister’s Special
Representative
in Iraq) to intervene with the US if CPA policy
developments
“contravene
our overarching aim of an Iraqi oil industry which is
accountable,
transparent,
effective and profitable and entirely in the hands of the Iraqis
as
soon as
this is legally and operationally viable”.
346.
In a separate
background briefing on oil issues, the DTI characterised this
new
approach
as:
“… dealing
directly with the Iraqis … in our belief that the CPA is a
transient body
and it is
the Iraqis who will be running the business in the long
run”.187
347.
During a video
conference with President Bush, Vice President Cheney
and
Dr Rice
on 7 October, Mr Blair said that the UK would like to work
more closely with the
348.
Ms
MacNaughton’s framework was discussed by the Iraq Senior Officials
Group
(ISOG)
later that day.189
A DTI
official said that the key issues to resolve were the
composition
of INOC’s Executive Board and the distribution of oil revenues. The
lack
of a
long-term strategy for the oil sector remained a concern. To
influence the US, the
187
Paper DTI,
30 October 2003, ‘Background Brief on Iraqi Oil
Issues’.
188
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 7 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minster’s
Video-Conference with President Bush:
7 October
2003’.
189
Minutes, 7
October 2003, Iraq Senior Officials Group meeting.
425