4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
149.
In support of
the last statement the FCO identified:
•
continued
progress of Iraq’s ballistic missile programme and repair of
facilities
damaged by
Operation Desert Fox, and a belief that Iraq was planning to
extend
the range
of its permitted missiles;
•
concern
about reports of increased nuclear procurement, a view that
research
and
development on a nuclear programme had restarted, and a belief that
if
sanctions
were lifted Iraq could develop a nuclear weapon within five years;
and
•
a belief
that Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programmes
were
continuing.
150.
The JIC
Assessment of 28 November judged that:
•
Practical
co-operation between Iraq and Al Qaida was “unlikely”; and
there
was no
“credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD-related
technology
and
expertise to terrorist groups”.
•
Iraq was
“capable of constructing devices to disperse chemical
or
biological
agent, or radiological material”, but there was “no
reliable
intelligence
of any Iraqi intent”. If the regime was under serious
and
imminent
threat of collapse, WMD terrorism was possible but, in
other
circumstances,
the threat would be “slight”.
151.
At the request
of the FCO, the JIC assessed Iraq’s support for terrorism
on
28 November.77
The
Assessment is addressed in Section 3.1.
152.
In relation to
Iraq’s capabilities and the possibility of proliferation to
terrorist groups,
the JIC Key
Judgements stated that Saddam Hussein “would
consider”:
“WMD
terrorism, if his regime was under serious and imminent threat of
collapse. In
other
circumstances the threat
of WMD terrorism is slight, because
of the risk of
US
retaliation.”
153.
The Assessment
concluded that “Iraqi capability and willingness to conduct
WMD
terrorism” was
“not known with any certainty”. The JIC judged that Iraq was
“capable of
constructing
devices to disperse chemical or biological agent, or radiological
material”,
but it had
“no reliable intelligence of any Iraqi intent. Nor did it
have:
“… any
credible evidence of covert transfers of WMD-related technology
and
expertise
to terrorist groups, or of any Iraqi role in the anthrax attacks in
the US.
Iraq would
have to consider the risk of US retaliation … On balance, we judge
the
threat of
Iraqi WMD terrorism is slight, unless the
regime was under serious and
imminent
threat of collapse.”
77
JIC
Assessment, 28 November 2001, ‘Iraq after September 11 – The
Terrorist Threat’.
43