The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
military
action by demonstrating full and active co-operation with
UNMOVIC.
But he
has repeatedly failed to take this route. Leaving aside the
intelligence on his
concealment
tactics, his actions since the adoption of UNSCR 1441 are
strongly
indicative
of deceit. They include:
•
failure to
volunteer scientists for interview outside Iraq;
•
illicit
procurement, and subsequent concealment, of Volga
engines;
•
failure to
declare reconstructed facilities (including the rocket motor
casting
chambers)
previously disabled by UNSCOM”.
462.
In relation to
inspections, Mr Scarlett wrote:
“The
failure of UNMOVIC to uncover significant chemical or biological
weapons
has been
disappointing. But it is not wholly unexpected. On 16 October last
year,169
the JIC
judged that there was a serious risk that Iraq could prevent
inspectors from
finding
conclusive evidence of WMD before the spring, unless there was
additional
guidance to
UNMOVIC. The JIC pointed in particular to the importance of
interviews
free of
Iraqi intimidation: you know the limited progress in this
area.”
463.
Mr Scarlett
concluded:
“The JIC
view is clear. Iraq possesses chemical and biological weapons, the
means
to deliver
them and the capacity to produce them. The scale of the holdings
is
hard to
quantify: it is undoubtedly much less than in 1991. But the
evidence points
both to
Saddam’s view that the capability is already militarily
significant, and to his
determination
– left to his own devices – to build it up further.”
464.
A reference in
paragraph 4 of the minute to the conclusions being
“summarised
at Annex”
was crossed out by Mr Scarlett on the signed version of the
minute on
the No.10 file.
465.
Mr Scarlett
sent a copy of the minute to Mr Powell in February 2004 with
a
manuscript
note stating that he had “not yet traced a copy of the
Annex”.170
466.
The Government
could not find any evidence of an Annex. The Inquiry
concludes
one was
planned but not produced: hence the manuscript amendment removing
the
reference
to the Annex in paragraph 4 of the document.
169 A
version of 11 October 2002 JIC Assessment, ‘Iraq: The Return of
Weapons Inspectors’.
170
Manuscript
comment Scarlett to Powell, 2 February [2004], on Minute Scarlett
to Manning,
17 March 2003,
‘Iraqi WMD: Evidence of Possession’.
374