4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
396.
Sir David
Manning and Mr Scarlett went to Mexico and Chile on 1 and 2
March
to explain
the UK’s position to President Fox and President Lagos, and to seek
their
support for
the UK’s proposals for the Security Council.152
397.
Mr Scarlett
was reported to have told President Fox that the UK had
developed:
“… a range
of sources, some inside Iraq, that had proven reliability. We had
built up
a
consistent picture in which we had confidence. Our allies,
including Europeans,
had no
serious differences of substance with us …
“While we
believed that UNSCOM had been able to disarticulate Iraq’s
nuclear
programme
it had not been able to account for a wide range of chemical
and
biological
materials – we were particularly worried about VX and anthrax.
Even
conservative
estimates of material Iraq still held indicated the capacity to
assemble
thousands
of WMD artillery shells. Since 1998 Iraq had continued to
produce
new agents,
develop its missile capability and, with less success, reconstitute
its
nuclear programme.
“In 2002 a
conscious decision was taken to deny possession of WMD to
frustrate
a renewed
and strengthened inspection programme. We had watched a policy
of
concealment
and intimidation develop. Evidence had been dispersed,
factories
cleaned up
and scientists cowed.
“… Some
UNMOVIC successes in January resulted in further efforts to
hide
evidence
and deceive inspectors. Continued small successes forced Iraq
to
move to
a policy of slow, small concessions to give the impression of
movement
(eg on
missiles). For the UK, the litmus test would be interviews with
scientists.
Iraq
realised their knowledge was their Achilles heel, hence the
intimidation.”
398.
In the
subsequent meeting with President Lagos, Mr Scarlett was
reported to
have
described the intelligence assessment and, in response to a
specific question,
informed
President Lagos that “although there were some differences of
detail e.g. over
the degree
to which Saddam could weaponise, the French assessment was similar”
to
399.
The FCO
advised No.10 on 4 March that the UK Mission in Vienna had
confirmed
that the
IAEA was on the verge of closing the file on nuclear issues in
Iraq, despite
152
Telegram 1
Mexico City to Cabinet Office, 1 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Mexico’.
153
Telegram 34
Santiago to FCO London, 2 March 2003, ‘Chile/Iraq: Visit by Manning
and Scarlett’.
363