The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
[…] reports
on orders for illegal imports of missile related components and
missile
related
components and materials […] Because of the need for raw materials
and
components
from abroad, sanctions remain an obstacle to the development of
all
Iraq’s WMD
programmes.”
74.
Under a
heading “Implications”, the JIC observed:
“This
Assessment underlines the importance of pursuing vigorously work on
the
proposed UN
controlled goods list, which would help sustain effective controls
on
Iraqi WMD
development.”
75.
The Butler
Report commented that the Assessment “signalled a clear change in
the
76.
The Butler
Report considered that the JIC judgements on Iraq’s ballistic
missile
programmes
were “well-founded and properly expressed”.32
77.
Mr Miller
told the Inquiry that the intelligence on the ballistic missile
programme
was
“fuller, and in retrospect, proved to be more
reliable”.33
There was
reliable reporting
on missile
production at one site. Separate reporting about the retention of
Al Hussein
missiles
came from a source that was “characterised as regular and
reliable”.
78.
Mr Miller
added that the report on the retention of the Al Hussein missiles
was from
“a year or
two previously”, and that there was “a rather longer standing view
that their
disposal
hadn’t been properly accounted for”.34
79.
In relation to
the judgement that Iraq was “conducting nuclear related
research
and
development into the enrichment of uranium and could have longer
term plans to
produce
enriched uranium for a weapon”, the Butler Report stated
it:
“… was
based on two human intelligence reports, both from new sources
and
neither
speaking from direct, current experience. Unusually in the nuclear
field, we
conclude
that those reports were given more weight in the JIC Assessment
than
they could
reasonably bear.”35
80.
Mr Miller
told the Inquiry that there was “limited” new intelligence
underpinning the
Assessment
on the nuclear programme. There was an SIS report that scientists
had
31
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
221.
32
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
254.
33
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 6.
34
Private
hearing, 5 May 2010, page 7.
35
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
225.
28