8 | The
invasion
201.
Mr Watkins
sent a second letter later the same day in response to a request
from
No.10 for
advice about “how the Coalition intended to deal with Fedayeen and
the
Medina
Division [of the Republican Guard]”.132
The letter
said:
“… there
are a number of paramilitary or irregular forces operating in Iraq.
We do
not know
for certain which of these forces are putting up resistance in
southern
Iraq. Reporting
from theatre is using the term ‘Fedayeen’ as a generic term
for
‘irregular’
resistance.
“… The
success or otherwise of groups in Basra is likely to have a direct
impact
on the
way these forces operate in Baghdad …
“… Against
the background of our overall objectives and of the regime’s
options,
it is tempo
– namely rapid advance on Baghdad – that must take priority …
This
resistance
does not threaten the Coalition’s overall control of southern Iraq
or the
ultimate
attainment of our objectives, but mopping it up is not a trivial
task.
“The
military handling of this challenge in and around Basra will be a
matter for the
judgement
of … Major General Robin Brims, and we are keen to not try to
second
guess him
here. At present, his focus is on gathering information on the
strength
and
dispositions of irregular forces within and around the city, whilst
testing the
water with
robust patrolling in nearby az-Zubayr. The outcome of these
activities
will influence
the decision on whether, when and how to confront the
residual
opposition
in Basra. It should be borne in mind that the key military
objective
is to
‘screen’ Basra, to prevent Iraqi forces disrupting the US push
northwards:
this is being
achieved.”
202.
In relation to
the Medina Division, the MOD commented that the Iraqi
regime
could leave
it, and other formations, where they were, “making them vulnerable
to air
strikes and
an armoured assault; or withdraw it into Baghdad”. The exact
approach to
dealing
with it would be a “matter for the US land commanders to decide”.
The MOD
also
pointed out that “the engagement of the Medina Division is only a
prelude to the key
task of
dealing with Baghdad itself”.
203.
A list of
Iraq’s irregular forces and their roles was provided in an annex
to
Mr Watkin’s
letter:
•
The
Fedayeen Saddam: a militia
comprising approximately 11,500 active
personnel,
controlled by Qusai Hussein. In the event of a Coalition attack,
it
was
expected to be used for internal security, including repression of
civilian
uprisings.
•
The Ba’ath
Party militia: although
officially disbanded, the Ba’ath Party was
likely to
call out members to form an ad hoc force to conduct security
sweeps.
132
Letter
Watkins to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Irregular forces and the
Medina Division’.
35