4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
“But it
does make a convincing case that Iraq has been trying to recruit
people for a
nuclear
weapons programme and to acquire materials usable in such a
programme;
and that it
has been trying to extend the range of some missiles in breach of
Security
Council
resolutions. These are too deeply buried … there is too long a
prologue
on what was
happening before the inspectors were withdrawn. The dossier
should
either be
re-structured, and perhaps pared down, or have an executive
summary.”
193.
Mr Williams
warned that the exercise would be “counter-productive” if the
media
was allowed
to “trap” the Government “into having to provide ‘proof’ to Appeal
Court
standards”.
The focus should be on an audience that knew we could not have
“certain
knowledge
of what is going on inside a closed tyranny”, but
would:
“… take
seriously a careful assessment which avoids over-statement and
appeals
to people
to trust the judgement of those taking the decisions … understand
that
intelligence
is partial, dangerous to acquire and limited in what it is safe to
put out
in public.
If the dossier is judged by these … standards it will be worth
doing.”
194.
Mr Williams
also addressed the possible timing of publication depending
on
whether
“the UN route” was agreed, and the need for a longer-term strategy
for Iraq.
He concluded
that Mr Blair’s press conference had already had an impact,
with a Sky
poll
showing “48 percent favour military action, with 52 percent
against”. This suggested
that public
opinion was more fluid than the critics believed.
195.
Sir David
Manning commissioned Sir Richard Dearlove to examine
whether
SIS had
material for inclusion in the dossier.
196.
Sir Richard
Dearlove told the Hutton Inquiry that Sir David Manning
had
telephoned
him on the morning of 4 September and they had:
“…
discussed … to what extent it would be possible to put intelligence
from my
service
into the public domain; and I said that I thought it would be
possible … but
I would
insist on grounds of source protection on having the last word in
withholding
material
from publication, if necessary.”89
197.
In a
discussion on 5 September, Sir Richard Dearlove told Mr Straw
that SIS had
new
material for which the sourcing was “strong but indirect” which
might be used in
the
dossier. There might also be a “significant increase of relevant
intelligence” before
publication
of the dossier on 25 September.90
198.
Sir Richard
also told Mr Straw that the draft dossier “was weakened by the
JIC
doctrinaire
approach to its drafting”. It would be “better if SIS made its own
in-house
judgements
on the release of material from sources”. SIS had established a
team that
89
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 15 September 2003, pages
87-88.
90
Minute SIS,
5 September 2002, ‘SOSFCA – Iraq Discussions with C on 5
September’.
149