The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
920.
DFID did
not produce any proposals for longer-term reconstruction
until
27 March.
921.
Dr Rice gave
Sir David Manning an account of White House thinking on
the
handling of
Iraqi oil on 13 March. The OFF programme should be left in place,
but
sanctions
lifted to allow Iraq to use the proceeds as it chose. OFF should be
phased
out when
there was an Iraqi entity ready to take over revenues. The US also
wanted
to make
clear that military operations would not be paid for out of Iraqi
oil money. In
response,
No.10 asked the FCO to prepare a note on UK plans for Iraqi oil
revenues
for Mr Blair
to use in public.383
922.
On 14 March,
the FCO instructed the UK Mission to the UN in New York
to
start
discussions with the US delegation on a possible resolution to
modify the OFF
programme
and sanctions regime should military action lead to the absence of
an
effective
Iraqi government.384
923.
The UK
position was summarised in the FCO background papers for the
Azores
Summit,
sent to No.10 on 15 March:
“If the
Iraqi regime falls, new arrangements will need to be put in place
to enable the
OFF to keep
functioning. Our current plan is to table a resolution soon after
conflict
starts … We
are seeking to amend some of the procedures to speed up the
process
for
humanitarian goods …
“We would
hope that the Secretary-General would be able to transfer full
control
over oil
revenues to a properly representative Iraqi Government as soon as
possible
(not as the
US have suggested, an Iraqi ‘entity’, which could, particularly if
US
appointed,
fuel suggestions that the Coalition was seeking to control Iraqi
oil).”385
924.
Resolution
1472, adopted unanimously on 28 March, transferred authority
for
administering
the OFF programme to the UN Secretary-General for a period of 45
days,
with the
possibility of further renewal by the Security
Council.
925.
In early
March, the structure of ORHA and of the post-conflict Iraqi
Interim
Authority
(IIA) remained uncertain.
926.
On 6 March, a
UK official working for ORHA in Washington reported to
Mr Chilcott
that ORHA
would welcome “UK ideas on how to handle [the] Iraqi Foreign
Ministry” and
383
Minute
Cannon to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Iraqi Oil
Post-Conflict’.
384
Telegram
149 FCO London to UKMIS New York, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Military
Action – Sanctions and
Oil for
Food – Strategy Paper’.
385
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 15 March 2003, ‘Azores Summit’ attaching Paper FCO,
‘Iraq – Oil for Food
Programme
(OFF) and Sanctions’.
478