15.1 | Civilian
personnel
439.
The
introduction of the Locally Engaged Staff Assistance Scheme in 2007
in
recognition
of the uniquely difficult circumstances faced by LE staff is
addressed later
in this
Section.
440.
The IPU review
of security submitted to Sir Michael Jay on 30 June examined
the
FCO’s
approach to risk in Iraq, structures and procedures to manage that
risk, the extent
to which
those structures and procedures were being observed in practice and
whether
they
satisfied the FCO’s legal obligations towards its
staff.298
441.
The IPU
explained that other FCO departments had contributed to the
review.
DFID
officials had also participated and would report to their Ministers
separately.
442.
The IPU stated
that the FCO approach to risk derived from its “duty of care in
law
to take
reasonable steps to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm to … FCO
employees
(UK‑based
and locally engaged) as well as those who visit the premises of our
missions
and work
from there eg from OGDs”.
443.
The
description of the FCO’s duty of care was derived from a
paper
prepared by
FCO Legal Advisers as part of the 2004 FCO Security Review. The
Legal
Advisers
stated:
“Whether a
duty of care exists in particular cases depends on whether the
death,
injury or
damage sustained was foreseeable, whether there was a
relationship
between the
FCO and the claimant viewed by a court as one of ‘proximity’
and
whether the
court considers it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty
…
“Even if a
duty of care does exist in a particular case, the FCO is liable in
law only if
it is found
to have breached that duty, ie to have fallen below a reasonable
standard
of conduct
through negligent acts or omissions. The fact that an attack on a
mission
has
succeeded does not necessarily mean that the FCO was at fault or
has failed to
act
reasonably.”
444.
The IPU
described the FCO’s “basic approach” as “risk averse”:
“… if we
judge a situation exists whereby personnel are exposed to
greater
risk than
the mitigating measures in place to deal with that risk, that task
will not
be
undertaken …”
445.
Decision‑making
structures were reported to be in line with the
recommendations
of the 2004
review. London decision‑makers were the Foreign Secretary, the PUS
(and
FCO Board
of Management) and the Iraq Director, supported by the IPU. Advice
was
provided by
the Director General Corporate Affairs and Director General Defence
and
Intelligence
and their subsidiary departments, and by FCO Legal
Advisers.
298
Minute IPU
[junior official] to PS/PUS [FCO], 30 June 2006, ‘Iraq: Review of
Security’ attaching Paper
Iraq Policy
Unit, June 2006, ‘Review of Security of Staff and Missions in
Iraq’.
321